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Introduction
As William H. Chafe so aptly pointed out in Civilities

•

and Civil Rights, the agitation by blacks for civil rights
throughout the 1960s in Greensboro, North Carolina, was a
response to local conditions, but yet, was part of a

•

national phenomenon.

In 1960, four black students from

North Carolina A&T sat-in at a local Woolworth's Department
Store to protest the establishment's policy of not serving

•

blacks at the' lunch counter.

News of this local protest

spread like wildfire throughout the country.

•
•
•
•
•
•

As a result,

Greensboro was the site of the start of a new phase in

blicks' struggle for civil rights -- the sit-in movement.1
The "Second Revolution" had moved slowly after the 1954
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education of
Topeka, but its pace greatly accelerated with the onset of
the sit-in movement.

Blacks now had a mode of protest

highly visible and embarassing to this nation.

Through

sit-in demonstrations blacks' demands for equality and
racial justice were heard.

Other peaceful, high visibility

forms of protest -- i.e. the freedom rides and mass
demonstrations -- subsequently emerged and accompanied the
sit-in tactic and its variations such as jail-ins, swim-ins,
wade-ins, and sleep-ins in pressuring white America to do
something about discrimination and to seek racial justice.

As the protests continued and violence by white southerners

11

increased, the pressure escalated until the federal
lawmakers felt compelled to act on the issue.

The resulting

Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965
secured political and legal rights for blacks.

However, in

the late 1960s and early 1980s, social and economic equality
continued to elude blacks as most whites resisted the new
phase of black activism, Black Power, and �ietnam became an
overriding concern of the federal government.

•
•
•
•
•

Even into the

mid 1980s real change in this country's socio/economic
structure has not yet occurred, and as Chafe has suggested,
the story is not over.

Nevertheless, the movement for

change towards racial justice had begun and the overt
practice of institutional racism has generally been
overthrown.

These have been the results of the civil rights

movement for the nation, Greensboro, North Carolina, and
Huntington, West Virginia.
By 1963, the shock waves of the sit-in movement and the
growing black unrest throughout the c?untry reached
Huntington.

This growing discontent with the status quo of

segregation and racial discrimination and the impulse from
the sit:in movement for direct, non-violent pro�est combined
to mobilize several students at Marshall University who
formed the Civic Interest Progressives (CIP), a biracial
civil rights group.

Between 1963 and 1965, the CIP, as will

be demonstrated in this thesis, provided the spark needed to·
challenge the existing discriminatory status quo in

r
l

•
•
•
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Huntington and at Marshall University and bring about
change.

In essence, the CIP activists brought the civil

rights movement and the demand for racial justice to this
town and to this university, and with varying success made
people deal with their consciences and address the issue of

•
•

equality for all .

The CIP's persistence in securing civil rights at
Marshall University overlapped with its efforts in
Huntington.

•
•
•
•
•

Though many similarities exist between the two

environments, the nature of the 'battle and certain
characteristics differed.

For clarity this thesis has been

artificially divided to make it easier to understand the
CIP's struggles in both areas.
A number of people here at Marshall have contributed to
this project as well as to my personal and intellectual
maturation over the past few years.

In some way, all of my

professors have given something to me.

But, Robert Sawrey

and Frances Hensley selflessly gave of themselves on this
project and especially challenged my perceptions of reality,
broadened my horizons, and influenced and honed my thought
processes.

Thank You.

Of course, the quality of students and human beings
surrounding a person can add considerably to one's graduate·
studies experience.

My pa�t two years of graduate study

•
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have been richly blessed by the students encountered and the
friends I have made at Marshall.

•

like to thank John Hennen, Montserrat Chambers, Joe Eckhart
and Sally Keaton for all their help, companionship and human
kindness.

••

In particular, I would

support.

Also, my parents and in-laws have been sources of
However, the most thanks goes to my best friend

and wife, Angela, for all her loving support and
encouragement.

•

Many have aided on this project.

I would like to thank

the members of the Special Collections Department in the
Morrow Library for their deligence and patience.

•
•
•

Special

thanks go to Phil Carter, Bunche Gray, Michael Gray, Simon
Perry, and Charles Aurand for sacrificing their time to
share their memories and perceptions during oral history
interviews.

Finally, I need once again to thank my wife,

Angela, for contributing her opinions and for typing most of
the original manuscript.

To everybody, including those I

did not name who have contributed to my maturation or this
thesis, thank you .
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William H. Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights (New
Oxford University Press, 1981) has been a model for

ih\s work.
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Chapter I
Cast, Characters, and Philosophy of the CIP

•

The Civic Interest Progressives (GIP) formed in the
spring of 1963 after two whites, William S. "Chip" Caldwell

•

and Joseph McBride, approached Phil Carter, Marshall
University student and athlete, about several issues
important to black students and, apparently, to a few

•

interested white students.

Of foremost concern was the

practice of segregation and overt racial discrimination in
Huntington.

•

From this small beginning, Carter gathered

other concerned students to form a civil rights group to
overcome off-campus racial discrimination by working closely

•
•

with the West Virginia and Huntington Human Rights

.
1
.
Commissions.

As early as February 22, 1963, the MU student paper,
The Parthenon reported the planned formation of the CIP,
known initially as the "Marshall Action Group," on the MU
campus.

•

This broad based, biracial organization espoused

non-violent principles to oppose racial discrimination in
establishments serving Marshall students, and was loosely
affiliated with the national Student Non-violent

•

Coordinating Committee (SNCC).

had adopted the name Civic Interest Progressives and further
defined its purpose.

•

By March 8, 1963, the group

The CIP sought to eliminate

"discriminatory conditions and practices directed towarcl
minority groups in and around the Huntington area.112 The
CIP concentrated its efforts on gaining access to an

•

2

•

""'"''t.Jtrrestricted social life, equal job opportunities, and fair
l'r<Jusing for minorities.

To attain these goals, the CIP

activists followed three modes of operation:

•

contacting and

.� � ,{"naeling complaints through appropriate campus and
community channels, discussions with owners of

,.

establishments practicing discrimination, and finally, if
all else failed, direct non-violent protest.3
To carry out such a program against racial
discrimination, a dedicated core, or inner circle, of

•

members was essential.

Such a core of about twelve to

fifteen activists emerged and functioned, with minimal
turnover, as the heart of the CIP during its more than two

•

years of existence.

Some were black, some were white and

most were male; however, all were Marshall University
students committed to the cause of civil rights and racial

•

justice.

Significantly, most CIP members, about eighty

percent, came from some place other than Huntington.

•

Only

Rick Diehl, Tom Stafford, Michael Gray and Mary Hall were
This characteristic may have reduced
local influences and restrictions on the organization.4

natives of Huntington.

Lydia Curry, William Caldwell, Joseph McBride, Mary
Hall, Mary Moore, Charles Gordon, Rdbert Bloom and Patricia
Austin comprised the original CIP executive committee.5

•

This organizational set up was an attempt to avoid possible
power stuggles within the group.

Conspicuously absent from· .

this committee, however, was Phil Carter.

Carter believed

\
3

this

was done purposefully in order to protect him from

reprisals that might damage his basketball career.

As a

star basketball player at Washington Irving High School in
Clarksburg, West Virginia, he came to Marshall to play major
college basketball after reading an article in a spurts
magazine about the university and Hal Greer, a famous black
professional basketball player who played at Marshall.

The

black community in Clarksburg rallied to provide �arter with

•

a job, a scholarship, and a place to stay in Huntington so
he could attend college.

Once at Marshall, Carter earned a

basketball scholarship with the help of Dick Hall, a white

I•
1·

alumnus of Washington Irving High School.

Carter later

recalled that that was "really when I began to figure out
and understand the value of white friendships and networks
and the 'old boy' network.116
Despite his omission from the official CIP executive
committee list, Phil Carter was, if any one person was, the
leader, but he had a great deal of support from people like
Frank Helvey, Pat Austin, Danie Stewart, Rick Diehl, and
others.

•

Carter was articulate and "intelligent about his
radicalism.117 He was well read and understood the

complexities of power structures, how society ope�ated, and
the need for civil rights.

•

Simon Perry, an instructor in

the Political Science department, believed that Carter's
awareness of the civil rights movement coupled with his
personal qualities led him to be,

•

•
•
•
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
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. .. an outstanding leader. I think he followed the
movement nationally, and received a great deal of
instruction about what to do simply by his
observation of what was happening elsewhere. He
was, in my judgment, a very dynamic, forceful,
perceptive young man. He had lots of charisma,
and this enabled him to develop a fairly lar'ge
following o� students, both black and wgite. And,
they acted 1n a very courageous manner.
Carter led by example, but he was also a teacher to.the
CIP activists.

Carter knew what civil rights in American

society was all about and how to convey these concepts to
others.

One of Carter's proteges, Michael Gray, viewed him

as a teacher, but admitted Carter's qualities as a leader
dominated his perception of him:
We felt that Phil was articulate, intelligent,
had a lot of guts, and like my mother [Bunche
Gray] in this area [civil rights] spoke his mind.
Those were combinations that you don't find, and
there was a need for leadership on the campus.
So, it was almost9impossible not to be impressed
with Phil Carter.
Among the other leaders of the CIP, Frank Helvey was
the top, white, male leader.

Apparently, some care was

taken to emphasize the biracial nature of the organization
and Helvey, who was a little older than most of the student
activists, had the leadership ability and wisdom that the
CIP needed.

Helvey also had personal and intellectual

qualities very similar to Carter's, and tended to be a calm,
rational person who had a settling influence on the group's
emotions.10
Pat Austin was also a part of the CIP leadership.

She

was the only female leader in the CIP, a predominantly male

..... .

..,, ·

•
•
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organization.

In Michael Gray's opinion, sex1sm did exist

in the CIP, "This civil rights group was no different than

•

other civil rights groups, except I think we were a little
better, but a little sexist ...No doubt about that.

Except I

think Pat probably... made CIPers less sexist than SNCC
.
1111
and ...other groups...•

If Gray's analysis of minimal

sexism is correct, the CIP would probably have been one of
the least sexist activist groups in the country.

•
•
•
•
•

Many civil

rights organfzations practiced blatant sexism through rigid
work roles and peer pressure for sexual favors, particularly
in biracial situations.

Sara Evans in Personal Politics

has argued that this sexist experience in actiyist groups,
including tqe New Left fomented female consciousnesses on a
national level.

There is simply no way of determining to

what degree the CIP fit into Evans' thesis, although the CIP
probably practiced ,some sexism which contributed to this
phenomena of raising female consciousness.

Yet, the CIP

probably was no� as sexist as many other civil rights groups
because of Pat Austin's presence in a leadership position.
She and Phil Carter represented a tandem that was always at
the forefront of demonstrations and protests, and Austin led
the group in its final year, 1964-65.

While Austin

obviously rose above the traditional female roles, other
female CIP members may have performed in a more traditional,
subordinate manner.12

' 6

Besides her leadership, Pat Austin provided the CIP

•

with two other valuable assets--her writing ability and
knowledge of t'he media, especially the print media.

•

Whenever the CIP needed to make a public announcement or
present written protests, Austin wrote the appropriate
material.

•

Coverage of the GIP remained constant and'

thorough in The Parthenon.

As a The Parthenon reporter and

journalism major, Austin either wrote the articles or, at
least, made sure that someone on The Parthenon staff covered

•

the CIP's activities.

In addition, Austin understood how

the media functioned and courted'coverage of CI� activities
by the newspapers, radio and television.

•

She and other

members, such as Dave Peyton, knew how to obtain the maximum
attention of the media corps.

As a result,

The Huntington

Herald Dispatch and the Charleston, West Virginia, papers

•

also covered the CIP's activities throughout the
organization's existence.

•
•
•

Phil Carter believed that by

going to the Charleston papers "the cancer [racism as
defined as any form of racial discrimination or segregation]
of West Virginia, which included the leadership of
Huntington and Marshall University, came before the public
for all to see.1113 In this way, the CIP obtained leverage
for opposing racial discrimination.

Consequently, Austin's

expertise with the media proved invaluable.
Rick Diehl was another important leader in the CIP. · -ije

was the son of Vincent Diehl, one nf the owners of the

•
7

•

Bradshaw-Diehl Department Store in Huntington.

This store,

alo ng with Anderson-Newcomb, was one of the two major

•

department stores in the city.

Although the Diehl name

stood as a symbol of Huntington's social and economic
establishment, Rick Diehl, a former conservative Young

••

Republican, turned his back on his family's status and the
Huntington establishment when he joined the ranks of the
CIP.

•

Even worse, he became a lieutenant of the activist

group, a definite embarrassment to many influential, white
Huntingtonians, including his father.

Vincent Diehl had a

terrible time accepting his son's actions.
by Bunche Gray illustrates this point:

An anecdote told

"His daddy was

leaning down, drinking some water from the fountain in
Bradshaw-Diehl's store.

I walked up to him and I leaned

down and said, 'We want you for the movement. '

And Vincent

Diehl stood up and said, 'You already have my son!

11114

While Vincent Diehl had a difficult time accepting his son's
activities, Michael Gray believed that "the power structure
had ten times more difficult a time dealing with it."

Gray

concluded, "th'e [white] power structure hated Rick Diehl. 11 1 5
At times, other CIP activists like Cicero Fain, Tom
Stafford, and Danie Stewart acted in leadership roles.

Fain

who described himself as an "angry black man" in the 1960s,
led by example and resolve.16 Stafford grew up in.
Huntington and therefore supplied a local expertise crucial
to the CIP success in Huntington.

Also, Stafford created

•
8

•

the CIP ''share-in" tactic which is fully explained in

Chapter III.

Stewart acted as the politician of the CIP and

utilized this expertise on the group's behalf.

•

The backgrounds of all these CIP leaders reflect the

or ganization's diversity and explain its ability to function
as a civil rights challenge organization.

•

Everybody had a

different role to play in the CIP and that role depended
upon the individual's abilities and willingness to act.
essence, the CIP practiced "situational leadership."

•

In

If an

individual felt strongl� about doing something and believed
he or she could control the situation and was willing to
take the responsibility, then that person was the leader of

•

the activity and the rest of the CIP members supported the
effort.

This• concept, like SNCC' s "participatory

democracy," caused some disun_ity within the organization but

•

provided the flexibility necessary to accomodate the diverse

. .
17
capab·1·
1 1t1es
.
o f th e CIP act1v1sts.

The CIP enjoyed perhaps the best of all possible

•

relationships with SNCC -- autonomy yet with assistance.
SNCC did not proyide monetary support and the CIP activists

•

•

f
/,

trained themselves by reading and watching what happened
elsewhere.

Marshall University professors Simon Perry, Bill

Cook, Paul Stewart and Gerald Kumer aided by providing books
and suggestions.

However, SNCC did provide advice, through

liason Lafayette Surney, to the CIP leaders.

Also, Phil

Carter and Pat Austin occasionally traveled to SNCC's

•

I
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headquarters 1n Atlanta to participate in workshops and met

civil rights leaders from across the nation.

These two had

further associations with members from the National

•

Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
and Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and received a great
deal of help and advice on strategy from Neal Shahan, a

•

native of the Nitro, West Virginia area and a high school
teacher in Annapolis, Maryland.18

•
•
•
•
•

The CIP also received aid from local sympathizers.

The

blac� community in Huntington quietly supported the CIP's
actions and thus played an important role in the
organization's efforts.

Yet, Michael Gray recalls that in

the 1960s "black Huntingtonians [were] pretty dependent...on
the white structure to make a living.1119 Consequently,
Huntington blacks had to be careful of showing too much
t�tport for the CIP because of their economic dependency on
·l�e l!tl\ite-con
trolled economy. However, the white power
_
" $1:liiuc.ture never fully exploited the economic dependency of
the,�Jack community.

It really did not have to because most
Even so, many members of

black community supported the CIP through
food and money, and other more subtle ways .
were the shock troops, while the role of
consisted of valuable "behind the
and contributions.20

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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A few members of Huntington's black community visibly
stood out in support of the CIP.

For example, Marion T.

"Bunche" Gray and her sister Antoinette Lease opened their
homes to the CIP for private group meetings.

James Gipson

and Herbert Henderson provided legal services for the CIP.
Gipson served as the official CIP attorney, but Henderson,
as the attorney for the Huntington chapter of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),
is more noted for having fought the early legal battles for
the CIP.. Eventually, however, Henderson and the CIP went in
separate directions.

Additional support came from Gus

Cleckly and Andrew McDade, leaders of the Huntington Chapter
of the NAACP.

Reverend Charles Smith of the First Baptist

Church rallied what he could of the religious community and
became a strong, outspoken advocate of civil rights.

He

later served on the West Virginia Human Rights Commission as
did Mrs. Memphis T. Garrison, a local black activist.
Though black Huntingtonians helped the CIP in these and many
other ways, they did not control the CIP.

Their supportive

actions always s�rved the CIP's initiative withotit dictating
decisions or activities.

In describing his role with the

CIP, Herbert Henderson emphasized the group's -autonomy:
No one outside the group was controlling
them. T�eir protests were planned and executed by
them. My job was to give them support. I would
�ounsel them about how to �icket without getting
into deep trouble with the law. And, of course, I
defended them after they were arrested and
charged. I helped organize bail bonds for them.

I.
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•
•
••
•
•

But I never advised them when to picket and
against whom. Those ideas were theirs alone." 21
Yet, one black Huntingtonian, Bunche Gray, had a
definite impact upon the CIP activists.

As already

mentioned, the door to her home always stood open to the CIP
members.

But also, she was willing to risk speaking her

mind and acting upon her convictions.

These were attractive

qualities to students putting themselves on the front lines
against racial discrimination.

She was the rock of

stability these civil rights activists needed and sought
out.

Similar to the role assumed by black women in civil

rights activities throughout th� South, Bunche Gray
represented a mother figure for the CIP and the young black
activists in Huntington.

Bunche Gray also often acted as a

personal counselor to CIP activists.

She always advised

students to pursue their own goals and not to worry abo4t
setting pitfalls for enemies from the past.

Bunche Gray

believed in forgiving, moving ahead and giving justice a
chance to prevai1.22
Bunche Gray challenged people to examine themselves and
others around them.

She extolled the virtue of honest� and

believed that an individual should confront friends and
acquaintances with statements and actions in order to force
a person to reveal his or her inner self.

Perhaps the best

way to describe Gray's effect on the CIP activists is to use

•
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•

the words Phil Carter wrote in Bunche Gray's address book on
June 1, 1965:

•
•
•
•
•
•

The Meeting
From the depths of despair comes a human
relationship that is enthralling and rich. This
experience is enthralling to me because you are
radiant with hope and a keep your head up
philosophy which you so adamently espouse and
which you so violently act out and upon. This
experience is rich to me because you have
instilled within me a significant amount of your
belief in the full, thick quality of life.
Due to the meeting, I have had to re-evaluate
myself and my initial so called friends and now
have a renewed interest in this definition of·
friendship.
You would be surprised to know that I cannot
express my opinion of you nor my need for you.
But then being as perceptive as you are, you have
probably [by] now [already realized] this since
you met me which was a time before I really met
you. With all sincerity, I feel I have profited
from your advice to me the:
1) family man
2) to the confused, immature kid
3) the fake humaniterian
4) the weak leader
5) the lonely man
6) the man who wants to love or maybe he
already does and is afraid to admit it.
Mrs. Gray with all my sincerity, thank you.
Philip W. Carter.23
The extent of Bunche Gray's influence on the CIPs can

terhaps best be judged by realizing that the group adopted
ilmo$t all of her personal philosophy for its own
Bunche Gray challenged people, including the

f activists,

to examine themselves and others around them.
Huntington business managers and owners
and to acknowledge black civil rights.

•
•
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Both :he CIP and Bunche Gray were willin� to use
confrontational tactics if needed to make a point or expose
discrimination
The CIP presented and maintained a public philosophy

•
•
•
•
•
•

resembling Martin Luther King, Jr. 's moderate, non-violent
position.

Every CIP demonstration used non-violent, direct

action tactics.

In only a couple of minor incidents was

this creed violated.

Close associates of the ClP such as

Bunche Gray, Herbert Henderson, and Dr. Simon Perry
personally espoused King's non-violent philosophy and
believed the CIP activists did likewise.

adhered to King's non-violence strategy and no doubt many of
the activists fully advocated the concept.

·L

Privately,

however, some CIP leaders, particularly Carter, sympathized
with the message of Malcolm X and other black militants.
They concluded that sometimes correction of an unfair
4
situation required force, not words.2
Yet, Carter realized that non-violent tactics would be
more effective in Huntington, West Virginia.

Black

militancy worked best where white resistance was strong and
blacks were numerous.

In Hunting�on, blacks represented a

small minoritv and the whites, out of ignorance and apathy,
basically ignored race problems.

•tt

The CIP publicly

The CIP would not have to

make much of a noise to shock most Huntington1ans into

increased civil rights awareness.

Hence, the CIP needed to

confront people directly with their practices of racial

I
,;!
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discrimination and force them to make a decision, namely
integrate or maintain the status quo.

The CIP repeatedly

utilized this tactic as part of what Carter calls the
"conflict utilization theory."

If at first, words did not

sway a resistor, then the CIP used demonstrations to bring
the conflict directly into the public arena.

From there,

the pressure escalated as the CIP would tenaciously continue
pressing the issue.

Eventually, either the resistor or the
. 1·ate. 25 Th.is was a strategy ta1·1or made
Clphad to capitu
for Huntington.where adverse publicity and public

embarrassment and pressure proved to be effective weapons.
So, armed with the cause of civil rights, a dedicated core
of activists and supporting cast, and a non-violent,
conflict utilization philosophy, the CIP was ready to
grapple with overt racial discrimination in Huntington.

•
•
•

•
•
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Chapter 11
"The Tentacles of Racial Discrimination 111
When the CIP formed in the Spring of 1963, the civil
rights organization concentrated its efforts on the
Huntington community.

Though a student group based at

Marshall University, the CIP initially addressed the
problems in Huntington because Marshall's black students had
to abide by the rules of the Huntington environment which

included wide ranging discrimination.2

In her study of the Human Rights Commission of
Huntington, Nancy Potter Matthews convincingly argued that
in the early 1960s Huntington was an uninviting environment
for blacks:
In a border state like West Virginia or a
municipality like Huntington with a very small
Negro population, the color line exists by tacit
agreement instead �f law. Negroes were denied
equal access to many parts of the public arena
that white citizens took for granted; they were
restricted to the lower levels of industrial
occupation; they were seldom ever allowed to enter
the white-only area of management; they were
restricted to a specific residential area; and
they were generally excluded from private circles
of white association. In comparison to the deep
South, there was less overt hostility and
denigration, less conventional prejudice, but this
merely made whites less aware of the olor line
while Negroes felt it just as keenly. 3
However, Cecil B. Moore, Philadelphia attorney and
President of the N AACP, spoke in Huntington on July 14,
1963, and noted that race relations in Huntington were good
compared to many places he had seen.

Moore said Huntington

blacks "didn't feel the pang and thrust here that [blacks

•
•
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·. in] other cities felt where there are signs which say
'colored' and 'white. 1114

•
•

"picture in Huntington is not as rosy as yo·u may think," and
he urged local blacks to fight poor housing, the lack of
employment opportunities and more subtle forms of
discrimination that existed in Huntington.5
No doub� Huntington was better than many southern
environs.

•
•
•
•

Nonetheless, Moore added that the

However, a significant amount of overt racial

discrimination did exist in Huntington in 1963.

That summer

an article in The Herald Dispatch claimed that most
restaurants and all theaters and major hotels in Huntington
reportedly served blacks.6 But, in actuality, blacks and
whites could eat together in only one restaurant and could
not drink together in any.

Camden Park had an annual

"Colored Day," the only day on which blacks could enter the
amusement park.

To see a movie together, according to Phil

Carter, one had to ask, "Which movies can blacks go to, and
what days, and would we have to sit upstairs.117 The Keith
Albee Theater hosted an annual "Preaching Mission."

For one

week a year, preachers were brought in from all over the
country and large numbers of blacks attended.

However, the

Keith Albee's doors remained closed to blacks after that one
week.

To see a movie blacks had to go to another movie

theater in town.

These are just a sample of the obstacles

that confronted Huntington area blacks, including those
attending Marshall University.

Black Marshall students

•
•
•
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keenly felt the shackles of Huntington's racial

discrimination and led the way in denouncing it.8
Bruce Moody, a graduating black basketball player,

lashed out at Huntington's discrimination in a May 1962 The
Parthenon article.

•
•

In one sentence, Moody summed up the

black experience in Huntington, "Racial discrimination is
practiced in movies, restaurants, amusement parks, and

employment." 9

Moody recounted four specific incidents to

illustrate his point about racial barriers in Huntington.
Campus Sundries, a fast food establishment which catered to
Marshall students, willingly served white students within

•

the establishment, but offered only carry out service to
black students.

Also, a black student had been denied

entrance because of his race into an American Legion dance

•

supposedly open to all Marshall students.

The third

incident involved two black members of a physical education
class who could not enter the Riviera Golf course as part of

•

a class field trip.

Finally, Moody wrote about another

physical education class where black students could enter
Colonial Lanes, a bowling alley, as part of the class, but
not as black individuals when they sought to return later.10
These four incidents related by Moody could convey only
a fraction of the magnitude of the problem, a problem most
white Huntingtonians were not aware of or simply ignored.
t

This pervasive discriminaitor , however, became permanently

•
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•

imprinted upon many black Marshall students.

As Moody

wrote:

•

The tentacles of racial discrimination
stretch out into many different areas. In order
to avoid any kind of embarrassment, many Negroes
on Marshall's campus tend to practice a self
imposed discrimination. This type restricts their
social life almost exclusively to themselves. It
is a possible result of prior restriction� on and
off campus, that gives them the need to coni�rm
and to hide themselves in a group identity.
The need for civil rights was evident in Huntington but

•

nobody wanted to take charge and lead the way.

power structure had no reason to alter the status quo and no
intention of doing so.

•

The white

The Huntington Human Rights

Commission, formed in 1963, had no real power and acted only
as a sounding board to hear complaints.

This satisfied the

power structure which did not have to deal with the matter,

•

and appeased some blacks and liberal whit�s with a facade of
concern. 12 The West Virginia Human Rights Commission, which
had been in place since 1961, seemingly could or would do

•

little about local situations because of its newness or lack
of power.
persuasion.

•

Both organizations relied heavily upon
For many blacks the human rights commissions

did not represent mechanisms for positive change.
Yet, the black community feared that civil rights
agitation would result in economic retribution from the

•
•

white power structure.

The potential turn�d to reality

often enough to justify the fear.

Consequently, few black
were willing to endorse publicly civil rights efforts.13

•
•
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Throughout the state, the black community was restrained on
the civil rights issue because of its economic dependency

•

and small population.

Only about 89,000 blacks resided in

West Virginia in 1960; this represents about 4.6 percent of
the total state population and also one of the smallest

•
•

black populations in the region.

All states bordering West
Virginia had considerably larger black populations.14 The
black population of Cabell County and Huntington hovered at
a little less than five percent.15 This indicates a small
population base from which to draw upon for protests.

So,

mass demonstrations were impossible and that limited what

•

civil rights activities could take place .
The ministers in Huntington, by following the lead of
southern counterparts, could have been a strong, positive

•

force for civil rights considering the influence religion
had in the community.

Yet, they failed to do so.

The

Huntington Ministerial Association (HMA) split on a ratio of
two to one against the issue of civil rights.

One member of

the HMA articulated that, "they felt you shouldn't roil the
waters.1116 None of the larger churches on Fifth Avenue
supported civil rights�

Only a few smaller churches, mostly

black in membership, and a handful of pastors spoke in favor
of civil rights.

Probably the most fervent of the pro-civil

rights pastors was Charles Smith, a black minister at the
First Baptist Church.

Besides opening his church as a base

for civil rights activists, Reverend Smith worked with the

•
•
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CIP, the Huntington and West Virginia Human Rights
Commissions, and the business and community leaders to bring

•

about change, but only after the CIP's initial protest
actions.

Black minister Reverend H-arry Coleman of Ebenezer

United Methodist also supported civil rights activities.

•

Reverend Royce MacDonald, a white minister at Enslow Park
Presbyterian Church, acted in similar fashion to Reverend
Smith concerning work with the Human Rights commissions and

•
•
•
•
•
•

community leaders; however, he was far less vocal and
considerably less effective.

Reverend Charles Aurand of St.

Paul's Lutheran Church, and other white ministers, including
Reverend McDonald, went against the sentiment of their
congregations and did what they could on their own to fight
for racial justice.

Nevertheless, no representative from

the religious community or anywhere else in Huntington came
to the forefront to fight for black Huntingtonians' rights,
let alone struggle for the needs and demands of Marshall's
black students.17
Realizing that help was not forthcoming from the
community at large, many blacks looked toward Marshall
University for leadership in achieving civil rights.

Bunche

Gray, for example, believed that Marshall University as a
citadel of higher education was responsible not only for its
own environment but also for _Huntington.

She insisted that

Marshall should have taken the lead in the 1960s and dragged
Huntington into the civil rights era along with it.18 Bruce

•
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Moody, while acknowledging that off-campus discrimination
and racial problems were not the specific concern of
Marshall, wrote the following plea/challenge for help in
fighting Huntington's discrimination and making the
community environment a better place for black students and
black residents:
These problems I have mentioned are all
problems that exist in Huntington today. If
nothing is done about them, they will exist
·tomorrow and for the years to come. I am quite
sure that if the necessary changes are to come
about, they will be product of a joint effort of
all those involved. I have a great deal of faith
and confidence in Marshall University and feel
that it will aid in allevi�ting the present
conditions in Huntington.
Quite naturally, looking toward Marshall for leadership
meant looking toward President Stewart H. Smith.

By the

early 1960s Smith, who had become President in 1946, had
established himself as a leader at Marshall and in
Huntington.

Smith had previously worked to gain access for

blacks to certain formerly all white establishments in
Huntington.

A major reason for this was that Marshall had

to provide accommodations for Qlack and white athletes on
visiting Mid-American Conference (MA�) teams.20 As a
result, the restaurants and hotels which served visiting
black athletes began catering to all blacks.

Even so,

Smith's efforts merely made a bad situation a little more
tolerable.

Marshall University represented the

southern-most MAC school and visiting teams felt

•
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•

uncomfortable being in Huntington.

Smith's efforts were not

completely successful if Phil Carter's view that blacks on
"The Mid-American Conference [teams] hated.like hell to come
·
here... " was correct. 21 Consequently, Marshall's black

•

athletes shielded the visiting black athletes in the early

•

1960s from individuals and establishments hostile to blacks .
Sadly, President Smith morally and intellectually supported
civil rights, but his leadership in opposing discrimination

•

ended after urging several hotels and restaurants to
integrate and accommodate visiting MAC athletic teams.
And yet, members of the CIP, other students at

•

Marshall, and black Huntingtonians looked to President Smith
for leadership.

For example, by March 27, 1963, the CIP had

tested for, found, and reported discriminatory practices at
three Huntington establishments.

The report, filed with the

University Human Rights Commission, a Student Senate
committee, cited Colonial Lanes (a bowling alley), Thabit's
Delicatessen, and the White Pantry as practicing
discrimination.

Colonial Lanes refused to let black

Marshall students bowl.

The other two establishments

refused to serve black students inside the premises, but
offered blacks carry out service.

•

Stuart Thomas, an MU

senior from Hurricane, read the CIP reports to Marshall's
Student Senate and recommended on behalf of the University
Human Rights Commission "that the Student Government request
the university administration to express to these

•
•
•
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establishments the concern of the student body re�arding the
22 This was a small
discriminations against its members.11
gesture to be sure, but one that could have -proven effective
if Smith had used his influence in the community.
No evidence exists to indicate that the recommendation

•

was ever acted upon, but just three weeks later, on April
15, 1963, President Smith met with Reverend Royce MacDonald
from the Huntington Human Rights Commission, Howard

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

McKinney, head of the West Virginia Human Rights Commission,
a Dr. Walker, and Deans Lillian Buskirk and John Shay,
concerning discrimination in Huntington.23 Two days later
Smith released the following statement on discrimination:
Continuing racial discrimination in several
public places in Huntington, affecting some of our
students, including foreign students, has caused
embarrassment to these students, to the University
and to the city of Huntington.
Marshall University took the initiative in
the elimination of discriminatory practices before
the Supreme Court decision in 1954 and has been a
leader in promoting the same throughout
Huntington. Our University continually endeavors
to bring about mutual understanding and respect
among all racial, religious and ethnic groups
represented in its student body and faculty.
The primary reason why racial discrimination
in America must ultimately be ended is because it
is fundamentally wrong. Racial discrimination
contradicts and violates the essentials of
democracy. The principles of American Democracy
which provide for equality of opportunity and
which are taught throughout our systems of public
and private education will have little meaning or
significance if they are not practiced by an
educated citizenry.
The people of Huntington are to be commended
for the progress toward providing equal dignity
and opportunity to the Negro in the past ten years
than was achieved in the preceding ninety years.

•
•
•
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While we are strongly opposed to all forms of
coercion or public demonstrations, we pledge our
assistance to the State and Huntington Human
Rights Commissions in �heir efforts to end
discriminatory practices through discussions and
throug24every other available fair and ethical
means.
Through this document, a clear picture of Smith's

•

position emerged.

He rejected the concept of racial

discrimination and noted the ill effect the practice had on
MU and the Huntington community.

•
•
•
•
•
•

Nevertheless, President

Smith diluted his principles when he commended Huntington's
citizenry and reaffirmed his suppport for the organizations
set up by the white power structure to deal with race
problems.

In no way did President Smith support the actions

and position of the CIP, hence the wording "... strongly
opposed to all forms of coercion or public demonstrations."
In short, President Smith was ready to talk about civil
rights, but little more.

He certainly was not going to have

Marshall University lead the fight for civil rights and
racial justice.

By April 1963 the CIP activists had come to

realize this, and begun to take the initiative themselves.
As Phil Carter foreshadowed in a statement at a forum on
integration in 1962, "the storm is coming.. ·.we can face it

together, or we can face it separately. 1125

Ih 1963, the CI·P

activists stood alone for the cause of civil rights in
Huntington, West Virginia; they brought the "storm" to
Huntington and later to Marshall University.
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Chapter III
. The Storm Comes to Huntington
Armed with the cause. of civil rights, the need for

•

chanie, and a philosophy of confrontation, the CIP attacked
racial discrimination in Huntington, West Virginia.

Phil

Carter recalled, "we challenged people to do something.

•

We

challenged the Huntington people and the Huntington students
to do something for themselves.111 This statement suggests
that most of the CIP activists were from someplace other

•

than Huntington.

Only a few courageous local souls braved

the wrath of the Huntington community, and only one of the
original eight on the executive committee, Mary T. Hall, was

•

from Huntington.

Throughout the life of the organization,
few Huntington residents became members of the CIP. 2
Carter's usage of the word "challenged" refers to the

•

"conf 1 i ct ut.i 1 iza tion theory" which Carter and the CIP
adhered to as a tactic as well as a philosophy.

As Carter

further elaborated:

•
•
•
•

We usually would go into an establishment,
and try and find out if they would serve us.
Usually you could just assume that ninety-nine
percent of the time you were not going to be
served. And it was because no one had ever been
in there before and asked to be served.... Each
time you did that you really didn't know what the
reaction would be. You really didn't know when
someone would get up and knock the Hell out of you
or pull a gun on you or try to cut you or lock the
establishment up or call the police on you or call
up the local Big Green me�ber... and say 'take this
black guy's scholarship.'
Conflict utilization required that CIP members face up to
conflict rather than inconvenience themselves by going out
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of their way to patronize establishments where they were
sure to be welcomed.

Conflict utilization also meant taking

advantage of an existing racial conflict to expose local
racial discrimination and demand its end.

Consequently, a

lot of quiet integration took place in Huntington.
Individual black CIP members would enter establishments and
ask for service.

This would force the owners of the

establishments to act, by either serving the black
student(s) or clinging to tradition.

Many owners opted to

serve the black students rather than have any trouble with
.

protest d emonstrations. 4

Some CIP protests grew out of such deliberate testing
actions by blacks.

Others resulted from reports by white

students who had over�heard white business owners bragging
fearlessly about not serving blacks.

However, many of the

original CIP activists got their first taste of protesting
racial discrimination in the Spring of 1962 as their
graduation present to Bruce Moody, a black basketball player
at Marshall University.

They sought to avenge the

discriminatory treatment he had received at the Palace
Theater.

After getting no satisfaction from the Palace

Theater management, Moody and several of his black friends
at Marshall planned to picket the establishment.

On the

evening before the initial demonstration at the Palace
Theater, the would-be pickets met at the home of Bunche and
Conklin Gray to make signs.

The next morning, Easter

•
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•

Sunday, the picketing began.

Easter Sunday had been

· selected by the demonstrators because of the apt religious

•

symbolism surrounding the Christian belief in Christ's
resurrection from the tomb on Easter.5
Yet, even before the demonstration, apprehension

•

mounted in the black Huntington community.

Mrs. Memphis T .

Garrison, a member of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and later a member of

•

the West Virginia Human Rights Commission (WVHRC) and

•

to protest at the Palace Theater.

•
•
•
•
•

recipient of an honorary doctorate in 1970 from Marshall
University,6 expressed concern about the CIP. activists' plan
Gray remembered relating

to Garrison in no uncertain words, "I'm getting damn sick
and tired of hearing your mouth.
honey."

And I'll see you in Hell,

On Easter morning Garrison called Gray and asked

where the students were.

After hearing the student

demonstrators were in front of the Palace Theater as
planned, Garrison said, "Thank God.117 Garrison represented
the "old guard" of black activists in Huntington and the
apprehension this group felt about upsetting the status quo
had prompted the first phone call.

By Easter morning,

however, she reportedly had overcome her fears and
acknowledged the necessity of the action.

After less than

two weeks of picketing, the Palace theater management agreed
to discontinue discriminatory practices.8

•
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Within a year, many of the pickets at the Palace
Theater had joined the CIP, and together they spearheaded

•

the deliberate planning and execution of the initial CIP-led
demonstrations in Huntington.

The CIP'·s first target was

Bailey's Cafeteria, one of Huntington's most respected

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

I•

establishments.

The idea of protestin g Bailey's policy of

not serving black customers originated from a white CIP
member because Bailey's was a popular restaurant in
Huntington that catered to middle class and professional
whites.
Bailey's.

Consequently, many important people ate at
In a sense, a blow against Bailey's symbolized a

.
' s wh.ite power structure. 9
blow against Huntington

Yet, before engaging in a direct non-violent
demonstration, the CIP followed its method of operation and
tried to persuade Bailey's to serve blacks.

The CIP

conferred with the Huntington Human Rights Commission about
Bailey's policy of not serving blacks, but garnered no

satisfaction or support from this "proper channel.1110

Next,

two black students and one white stude nt conversed with
Bailey's Cafeteria co-owner and manager Floyd E. Walker
about integrating the cafeteria.

Walker told the students

he would not change the policy of not serving blacks because
he feared the cafeteria would lose considerable revenue from
the white clientele who regularly patronized the
establishment.

He further noted that Bailey's had served

blacks, specifically those on athletic teams, in the past

•
•
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but only after the cafeteria had closed to the general
public.

•
•

Walker knew his answer did not satisfy the students

and later admitted he suspected that a demonstration would
occur at Bailey's, but he could not have guessed the form
11
the protest took.
On Thursday, April 25, 1963, between five and six p.m.,
ten Marshall University students, five white and five black,
staged a "share-in" at Bailey's Cafeteria.

•
•
•
•
•
•

Tom Stafford, a

CIP member, created the "share-in" concept to perpetuate a
"new social reality" based on racial equality and the ideals
of justice, brotherhood and love.12 However, the share-in
concept, as related by Phil Carter, proved to be an
innovative and effective tactic as well:
We would try to find creative ways of not breaking
the law. And, we went through this
rationalization that one way not to break the law
was to have white students go into these
restaurants, purchase the food, and since the law
said or the managers kept telling us 'we don't
serve you, and we don't serve them, or the law
doesn't allow us to serve you,' then we said it
wouldn't make any difference if the whites then
would share their food since we wouldn't have to
buy it. It wouldn't be a big problem to anyone.
And there'd be whites sit �ng there who would
share their food with us. 1
The share-in tactic was deliberately plotted by the CIP
to force Bailey's to let blacks eat within the restaurant.
The five white students, Aubrey King, Tom Stafford, William
"Chip" �aldwell, Robert Woken and an unidentified female

student, entered the restaurant, ordered food and sat down

37
at a table.

Afterwards the five black Marshall students,

Phil Carter, Gus Cleckley, George Hicks, Willie Tucker, and
Pat Austin, filed into Bailey's serving line.

When the

management refused to serve the black students, the white
students offered to share their food and table with their
No incidents took place but Walker had each
demonstrator photographed as a record. 14
black friendsA

Though limited, the share-in was a successful protest
tactic because the restaurants had great difficulty
combating it.

The management had no idea which white

students would buy food and share it with black students,
and the restaurants had to serve all white Marshall students
or suffer devastating economic losses.

Yet, the share-in

depended upon access to the establishment.

•

For example, the

CIP organized another successful "share-in" at Bailey's on
the following Tuesday, April 30, 1963, but when the
demonstrators arrived at Bailey's the next evening, Walker

•

put a stop to the share-ins.

restricted entrance into the establishment to white
customers.

•
•
•

Two men stood at the door and

The CIP responded by picketing and this became

the sole form of demonstration available to them once blacks
could not enter the cafeteria.

Even so, the CIP's picketing

further exposed the restaurant's segregationist policy and
compounded the publicity and embarrassment of the
management.15

•
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The Bailey's episode mushroomed to such a degree that
Howard W. McKinney, Executive Director of the West Virginia

•
•

Human Rights Commission (WVHRC), summarized Bailey's refusal
to serve blacks as "giving the whole state a kind of bad
reputation.1116 McKinney attempted to meet with Walker on
Wednesday, May 1, 1963 to discuss Bailey's policy of not
serving blacks, but he was unsuccessful in getting a
meeting.

•
•
•
•
•
•

The WVHRC could not very well function to relieve

racial tensions and promote racial justice if one side
refused to negotiate.

Thus rendered ineffectual, McKinney

and the WVHRC could not see any alternative and endorsed the
CIP demonstrations in a statement declaring, "we may
logically expect that Negroes in West Virginia will protest
with every means at their command when our efforts and those
of local human rights commissions bear no evidence of
.
.
1117
fru1t
. f u 1 negotiations.
After their refusal to discuss the matter with McKinney
led to more picketing by the CIP, Floyd Walker and Sadie B .
Bailey, co-owners of Bailey's Cafeteria, sought an
injunction against the CIP and individual protesters to
"forbid mass or obstructive picketing, any unlawful act to
prevent the petitioners from conducting their business, or
8 Bailey hoped
blocking of the cafeteria entrance or exit.111
to have the number of pickets limited, if not completely
forbidden.

Essentially, Walker and Bailey wanted the court

system to uphold their r1ght not to serve blacks by

•
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•

outlawing the highly visible and embarrassing CIP-led
demonstrators.

The WVHRC termed the petition for an

injunction "a step backward in race relations," and the CIP
19
. ht on pie
. keting.
.
just kept rig

•

At 10 a.m. on Saturday,.May 4, 1963, eleven summoned
students appeared before Circuit Court Judge John W .

•
•
•

Hereford and a capacity filled courtroom concerning Walker

I

and Bailey's injunction request.

Henderson represented the students while Bliss T. Charles
presented Bailey's case.

When Henderson moved for

additional time to prepare the defendants' case, Judge
Hereford granted a one week postponement.

However, Judge

Hereford made it clear that justice would be served
regardless of race.

•

Attorney Herbert H.

This� in itself, was a victory for the

student defendants, particularly considering the closed
legal channels in the South.20
Even more encouraging to the civil rights activists was

•
•
•
•

the choice of words used by Judge Hereford to Bailey's
counsel:
I can't tell what they [the student defendants]
are doing that they shouldn't be doing. I can't
tell why, from this petition, that the plaintiffs,
Bailey's refuse to serve them. There is nothing
in this petition that indicates to me why Bailey's
doesn't serve these people. And I would like to
know that. Why they picked this part} 1 ular group
out and refused to give them service.
Attorney Charles insisted that the petition had nothing
to do with segregation practices when he replied to Judge

•
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Hereford's query saying that Bailey's "reserved the right to
serve who they choose...as a private operator of private
property.1122 Charles' answer did not appease Judge Hereford
who responded:
Apparently this is the first time I have heard of
them exercising their choice. However, I would
like to drop this thought and it might be helpful
to both sides. That if this is a problem 0f
Bailey's refusing to serve Negroes--and I have a
suspicion that that is what it is--and if they
refuse to serve Negroes... because it is a private
business, say they do have the right, which in my
way of thinking, is violating the spirit--maybe
not the letter--but the spirit of the Supreme
Court decisions of the United Stat 2� and_ the
Constitution of the United States.
Judge Hereford denounced Bailey's racial discrimination
and said that although Bailey's as a private business could
legally practice segregation whereas the federal government
could not, it could not expect the courts to aid the
restaurant in its discriminatory practices.

He also noted

that picketing, if it did not obstruct the free flow of the
sidewalks, was perfectly legal and a matter for the police
when the law was violated.

Judge Hereford then suggested

that the one week postponement, besides giving the
defendants adequate time to respond, would also give
Bailey's an opportunity to reconsider the petition for an
injunction and at least to provide ample time to amend the
petition so that it proved the law or somebody's rights had
been or were being violated.

Before adjourning, Judge

Hereford stipulated that there was to be no violence from

•
•
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either party.

As Judge Hereford had alluded earlier in the

hearing to Henderson, violence on the part of the pickets

•
•

would have forced him to grant the injunction.

appears the non-violent demonstration by the CIP proved to
be a practical method of resistatlce in Huntington.24
Certainly, the CIP's actions and Judge Hereford's
ringing words stirred a variety of responses in Huntington.
The CIP resumed its picketing of Bailey's.

•

So, it

The WVHRC had

already spoken in favor of the CIP's demonstrations.

One

writer concluded that the CIP's confrontation with Bailey's
sparked an outpouring of "symbolic·" support for the CIP from

•

formerly passive entities.

On Friday, May 10, 1964, the

Huntington City Council went on record as supporting civil
rights and racial equalitf by officially declaring ''that all

•
•

public or semi-public facilities be open to all persons
without regard to race, color, or creed," and vowing to work
toward this end.25
Four days earlier the Huntington ministerial
Association (HMA) had adopted a similar but more specific
position:

•

...the Ministerial Association of Huntington and
vicinity deplores the attitude of Bailey's
Restaurant in denying equal service to certain
citizens of our community because of their race,
and the Association urges that the restaurant
management reconsider and change its policy in the
light of the Jude2 Christian understanding of love
for our neighbor. 6
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The HMA also went on record supporting the right of the CIP
to picket.
Conversely, the Human Rights Commission (HRC) of
Huntington.never really approved of the CIP's actions.
Huntington's HRC took the position that the CIP
demonstrations made its job harder.

Members of Huntington's

HRC had spoken with Floyd Walker before, during, and after
the CIP's demonstrations, and they much preferred to
continue with negotiations to resolve the conflict.
However, the HRC did not totally condemn the CIP's direct
action tactics.

In a May 10, 1963, statement the ijRC

recognized "the right of groups and individuals to picket
and use other non-violent methods of protesting various
forms of discrimination such as refusal to serve Negroes in
public accommodations.1127 Nevertheless, the Huntington HRC
remained committed to being a conciliatory body, ready to
moderate negotiations for a settlement.
These aforementioned bodies all had different
motivations and varying perceptions, but they all affirmed
the CIP's right to demonstrate peacefully and expressed
support for civil rights.
shared these sentiments.

Not all Huntingtonians, however,
At a City Council meeting,

Chauncey R. Crabtree, a long-time patron of Bailey's, spoke
in favor of the �afeteria's policy of not serving blacks
because he did not believe the races should mix.28 At one
time Tom Stafford shared Crabtree's conviction, but the

•
•
•
•
•
•
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former Young Republican had a change of heart concerning
civil rights and became an ardent CIP activist.

This served

to heighten Stafford's awareness of the discrimination and
racist attitudes prevailing in Huntington.

During the

protest against Bailey's, Stafford had his dedication tested
as Bunche Gray related:
I understand that where he was picketing in
front of the Bailey's Cafeteria, an old white man
walked up to him and said, 'Boy, your father would
turn over in his grave if he knew that you were
doing this.' Then he backed Tom against one of
the walls of Bailey's Cafeteria...and they said
Tom said, "Yes sir, Yes sir." He didn't say a
word and he just l�stened to that man berate him
for doing that, and he kept demonstrating. And
you know, I couldn't help but appreciate the fact
that even though the elderly person was telling
him that he was doing something completely against
his fat?er's �ishes...he believed in us [enough]
to continue. 2
This anecdote reveals not only Stafford's dedication and
courage in working with the CIP, but it also shows the
degree of bigotry and opposition that confronted the CIP

•

activists, particularly if the activist was from Huntington,
as Stafford was.
As a result of the CIP's actions, a variety of

•

responses emerged before the legal showdown on the issue .
Essentiallly though, the responses can be categorized as
either sympathetic support (usually non-active), pro-racial

•

segregation, and the ever present but incalculable "quiet,
apathetic majority."

Many people quite simply did not want

to hear about racial discrimination.

•

That is probably why

•
•
•
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the Huntington Advertiser gave the Bailey's protests no
coverage and minimal treatment of the legal proceedings, and
30
why the general public was basically quiet on the issue.
Huntington had a conservative tradition that easily could
have left most of its citizens with racist attitudes and

•

secretly opposed to the CIP's actions.

Yet, Huntington

never fully. admitted to having a race problem, and
Huntingtonians seemingly tried to bury their collective

•

heads and ignore the problem by rationalizing that while
racial discrimination occurred elsewhere, it did not exist
in Huntington.

•
•
•

•
•

Herbert Henderson's perception supports this

analysis:
It's difficult to describe how the white
community felt about the protests in Huntington,
but my perception was that the pickets were an
embarrassment and i51everyone ignored them, they
would just go away .
The legal proceedings, however, could not be ignored.
By Wednesday, May 8, 1964, attorney Bliss L. Charles
had filed an amended petition for an injunction against the
CIP.

The amended petition alleged that the CIP had

intimidated and harassed the management and patrons of
Bailey's Cafeteria since April 25, 1963.

The CIP's actions

had supposedly blocked the cafeteria's entrance and exit so
customers had to push bodily through the pickets.

Also,

many customers feared crossing the picket lines to patronize
the establishment.

Consequently, Bailey's lost potential

revenue and had to dispose of unused food bought to serve

•
•
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the regular number of customers.

As a result, Bailey's

business had been harmed by the CIP's "massive and

•

disorderly" picketing and the cafeteria owners requested
that the Court affirm their right to operate a private
business and to be able to serve the customers of their

•

choice.

The amended petition asked the court to prohibit

picketing unless performed in an orderly fashion and to stop
the CIP from interferring with the plaintiffs and the

•

.
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conduct of bus1ness

On the following day, attorney Herbert Henderson filed
a motion for dismissal which listed the five following

•
•

reasons:
1. The complaint and affidavits fail to state a
claim against the defendants upon which relief can
be granted.
2. It appears on the face of the complaint that
the plaintiffs ·have full, complete and adequate
remedies at law in that a civil action will be for
recovery of any damages sustained.

•

3. The plaintiffs allege the commission of
certain crimes for which a warrant could be
obtained and the court cannot enjoin the
commission of a crime.

•

4. Plaintiff's cafeteria is licensed by the state
and. their [the state's] authority to license a
business for the public use is derived from the
public and the Negro is a part of the public as
well as. whites.

•

5. This court lacks jurisdiction in that the
state cannot through its judiciary enforce
so-called private discrimination in ��elation of
the state and federal constitutions .

•
•
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The last two points in the dismissal motion were the heart
of Henderson's case.

•
•
•

Point number five hinged on a broad

interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment and was central
to the civil rights issue nationally.

People like Governor

George Wallace of Alabama argued that the United States
Constitution did not specifically require that blacks be
given civil rights.

He took the position that states and

certainly all private concerns such as businessess could
legally practice segregation.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964

later resolved this issue but for the time being Judge
Hereford had to make his own decision.34
Saturday, May 11, 1963, was the day of reckoning for
Bailey's petition for an injunction.

The hearing began at

10 a.m. with Henderson's motion for dismissal the first
order of business.

Judge Hereford denied Henderson's motion

and five hours of testimony and the cross examination of
thirteen witnesses ensued.

During the testimony, Henderson

questioned a Bailey's ofricial about the cafeteria's policy
on serving blacks.

Henderson recalled that "he was proud to

say the cafeteria had never knowingly served a black.

And

he said it with such pride and determination I'll never
·

forget it. 113 5

Floyd Walker stated during the hearing that

the cafeteria's "white only" policy had been in effect since
1934 for the purpose of protecting business.

In essence,

Walker and his attorney, Charles, tried to show that

Bailey's had been selective of its customers for
quite some

-•
•
•
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time.

This was the argument supporting Bailey's right, as a
private business, not to serve blacks.36
For the rest of the hearing, Charles attempted to

demonstrate that the presence of the pickets disrupted the
normal operation of business and created tensions and the

•

potential for violence.
thirteen witnesses.

As proof, Charles called all

Walker testified that on April 30,

1963, black and white students entered Bailey's and blocked

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

the serving lines.

He, and later a police officer, asked

the students to leave.

When they refused, Walker claimed he

had to close the cafeteria early and lost forty percent of
its business, or about $350.

In another example, Walker

told of an incident on May 1, 1963, when he stationed two
male employees at the door to keep out the student
demonstrators and "two of the students tried to 'body-press
their way through. 1 1137 Also, a white customer had to
squeeze through the demonstrators on that evening to get
into the cafeteria.

Of the other twelve witnesses called by

Charles, all concurred that no violence occurred at any time
during the demonstrations but many of them had been fearful
of potential violence.

One witness called the tension

packed atmosphere at Bailey's an "explosive situation. 1138
In defense, Henderson countered by arguing that
Bailey's closed on April 30, 1963, because of its policy,
not due to the actions of the student demonstrators.
Henderson's defense hinged upon points four and five in his

•

,
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•

motion for dismisssal.

He contended that the State of West

Virginia could not license an establishment with a public

•

interest such as Bailey's Cafeteria and uphold the exclusion
of part of the public.

Furthermore, Henderson declared in

his defense statement, "when the state seeks to enforce

•

so-called private discrimination, such discrimination
becomes state action and comes under the scope of the 14th
Amendment.... 1139

•

By 4 p.m. the decision had been made.

Judge Hereford

denied Bailey's injunction request on the grounds that
neither property damage nor violence existed as a basis for

•

an injunction.

In addition, Judge Hereford noted that

peaceful picketing was the legal right of all citizens.

The

defendants, however, received a warning to keep their quest

•

for civil rights peaceful.

As Judge Hereford commented,
"we don't live in Birmingham, Alabama.1140 Nevertheless,
Judge Hereford did support the concept of civil rights and

•
•
•
•

the need for justice for all people, stating:
The cafeteria has been my favorite eating place
for years, but if it is a good place for me to eat
it also is a good place for Negroes to eat.
This is the Centennial year and we are
observing the beginning of a state born i� the
heat of the Civil War. A racial situation like
this is not conducive to a goS1 reputation for
Huntington or West Virginia."
Judge Hereford acknowledged that Bailey's petition for
an injunction was the hardest case he had had to judge in
his twenty-three years on the bench.

Yet, if he had doubt

•
•
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as to the wisdom of his decision, the United States Supreme
Court soon eased his mind.

•
•

On May 21, 1963, the Supreme

Court ruled on seven cases involving sit-in demonstrators
and determined that "a state or city may not interfer, in
any fashion, with peaceful racial integration sit-in
demonstrations in public places of business.1142 This
decision struck down laws and ordinances forbidding peaceful
sit-in demonstrations and prohibited state and municipal

•

officials from taking actions or making statements which
encouraged establishment� not to serve blacks.

Though

stemming from the 1960 lunch counter sit-ins, the Supreme

•

Court decision had relevance in Huntington in 1963.

Hereford's decision now had the backing of the United States
Supreme Court.

•

Judge

So long as the demonstrations remained

peaceful, Bailey's and other Huntington establishments had
no legal recourse.

Help in defending the segregationist

policies of private businesses was not forthcoming from

•

municipal or state government or from the courts.
Proprietors could still technically refuse to serve blacks
on their own, but as a dissenting Supreme Court Justice
declared, it "has certainly become a greatly diluted right,
if it has not indeed, been totally destroyed.1143 This

•
•

Supreme Court decision reinforced the CIP's legal victory in
the Bailey's case .
In Huntington, thereafter, every establishment could
legally be peacefully protested by the CIP or any other
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groups or individuals for not catering to blacks.

Civil

rights and integration efforts in Huntington had been given

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

a boost.

As for Bailey's, integration loomed as inevitable .

Sincere negotiations between several Huntington ministers,
Huntington's HRC, the CIP and Bailey's management took place
after Judge Hereford's ruling.

In less than a week the

concerned parties reached an agreement for a quiet, gradual
integration of Bailey's Cafeteria.

In the first phase,

Reverend Royce McDonald, a representative on Huntington's
HRC, accompanied Reverend Charles Smith into Bailey's for
the first meal to be eaten in the cafeteria by a black
person under integrated circumstances.

The second phase

called for a two week period of serving a small number of
After the two week period any and all
blacks wanting to patronize the restaurant could do so.44
black customers.

Through this plan, Bailey's began serving black and
white customers together.

However, as Carter related, the

CIP resented having black and white community leaders take
over negotiations, declare victory, and essentially tell the
CIP to go away:
...well, we've used these students enough, they've
done enough. Now you all retire and let us
sophisticated folks take over and negotiate all of
this because you don't understand a damn thing
[about] power. That was very painful and all of
us [CIP activists] resented it. And it was
deliberate and it was calculated to bring in what
we considered as 'a new black middle class.' that
was a responsible middle class that was really
created as a direct result of the pain and the
risks the students took. And certain students

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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were included in that new class and4§ here were
· certain students who were excluded.
Carter was not a part of the "new black middle class."
In any case, the struggle to integrate Bailey's was a
complete victory for the CIP, but the black CIP activists
did not feel victorious.

Carter explained that "most of the

time we kept our true opinions to ourselves because we were
afraid it would really frighten other people if they really
knew how much we dete�ted what was going on.

And very, very

candidly detested the fact that we had to do it! 1146
Nevertheless, the GIP had to push for civil rights.

The

need existed and the time had come.
The direct non-violent tactics of the CIP had worked
beautifully and seemed to be the key to unlocking
Huntington's segregated establishments.

Many GIP activists,

including Mary T. Hall, believed that only direct action
tactics would led to success:
In the 20 years that I have lived in Huntington, I
have found negotiation to be, in the majority of
cases, of little value. It is my opinion that a
demonstration would be more effective in breaking
discriminatory practice!7by certain establishments
in the Huntington area.
The GIP had done just that, and proved Hall correct in her
assessment.

By forcing the management of Bailey's Cafeteria

to deal with the issue of civil rights, integration
successfully resulted.

Even Reverend Royce McDonald later

acknowledged that only the pressure exerted by the CIP
forced Bailey's to integrate.

The GIP activists had been

•
•
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the galvanizing force to bring about positive change; they
had brought the civil rights storm to Huntington.
.
.
.
.
ha d Just
t he resistance to 1ntegrat1on
begun . 48

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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However,

•
•
•
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Chapter IV

•

Bigoted Resistance
Racial discrimination in Huntington had been dealt a

•

crippling blow with the integration of Bailey's Cafeteria,
but bigotry had not been swept away.

Racism soon reared its

ugly head once again in the person of Roba Quesenberry,

•

owner of the White Pantry Restaurant.

Because of his

actions to resist the CIP's integration efforts, the White
Pantry came to symbolize bigotry in Huntington.

•

The issues

of racial discrimination and civil rights had just begun to
subside after the integration of Bailey's when the CIP
stirred them anew.

•

The controversy surrounding the White Pantry began
during an interracial dance.

In 1963, interracial dances

represented the latest attempts at social integration.

•

of the interracial dances in Huntington were held at a dance
hall in the nine hundred block of Fifth Avenue, near the
White Pantry Restaurant.

II .

•
•
•

Many

One night early in the summer at

such a dance with the Parliaments, an all black band,
playing live music, a young black woman who was hot and
thirsty, walked down from the dance hall to the White
Pantry.

Though she was willing to pay and abide by whatever

restrictions the White Pantry had on serving blacks, the
restaurant promptly denied this young woman a cold drink.
Her resultant frustration and humiliation �pread throughout
the black community like wildfire.1

•
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•

The White Pantry had been marked as a practitioner of
discrimination by the CIP's March 1963 discrimination study

•

reported to MU's student government.

the White Pantry since then despite the CIP's successful
integration of Bailey's.

•

Nothing had changed at

Now the White Pantry openly

refused to serve blacks, and the CIP could not, and did not,
ignore this slap in the face.
On July 13, 1963, the CIP struck at the White Pantry

•

with a share-in demonstration.

Direct evidence of what

happened at this first demonstration does not exist.
However, Phil Carter mentioned this first encounter at the

•

White Pantry in his testimony at a September 1963 hearing of
Quesenberry's petition for an injunction.

Carter recounted

that twenty-five CIP-led demonstrators entered the

•

�estaurant and sat down to be served.

The waitresses

informed the black demonstrators they would not be served
and proceeded to take orders from the ten to twelve white

•

demonstrators present.

their food, they invited their black counterparts to share
in the meal.

•
•
•

After the white demonstrators got

tolerated.

This action by the demonstrators was not
Carter later testified that one employee "began

picking up every dish a Negro touched and slamming it to the
floor and breaking it.112 After watching this display, the
share-in participants quietly exited the restaurant .
News of the CIP's encounter with the White Pantry
spread across the state, and students from other West

•
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•

Virginia colleges, particularly from the predominately black
West Virginia State College, approached the CIP about

•

joining in the demonstrations or helping in other ways.
Eventually, Concord, Bluefield and West Virginia State
Colleges all had a subsiantial number of student activists

•

claiming membership in the CIP, and many of these student
activists, particularly from West Virginia State College,
often participated in CIP demonstrations at the White

•

Pantry.

As a result, the CIP received a great deal of
support from college students. 3
The West Virginia State connection became more evident

•

in the second protest of the White Pantry.

On July 27,

1963, the CIP-led student demonstrators from MU and West
Virginia State College met determined resistance.

•

protesters entered the White Pantry to begin a sit-in,
Quesenberry had the employees begin mopping with an ammonia
cleaning solution.

•

•
•
•

When the

Next, an insecticide was set off within

the restaurant and the air conditioning was turned off and
the heating system turned on.

The demonstrators withstood

about one hour under these conditions by placing
water-soaked handkerchiefs, handed to them from picketing
compatriots outside the restaurant, over their faces.
Quesenberry closed the White Pantry and forced the
demonstrators to leave.
restaurant reopened . 4

Later that day the 24 hour
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Unlike Bailey's Cafeteria, the White Pantry under
Quesenberry ignored the unfavorable publicity and pressure

•
•

exerted by the CIP and fellow demonstrators from West
Virginia State College, the Huntington chapter of the NAACP
and sympathetic citizens.5 Verbal and physical abuse
characterized Quesenberry's early and future resistance to
the CIP'.s integration efforts.

Both sides were ready and

willing to carry out a determined and prolonged struggle.

•

A third day of sit-in demonstrations at White Pantry
took place on Saturday August 3, 1963.

Between 1:30 p.m.

and 2:30 p.m., twenty-three black and two white students

•

staged a sit-in inside the restaurant with a line of pickets
outside.

Typically, Quesenberry turned off the air

conditioning, turned on the heating system and burned

•

sulphur and insecticide cakes.

The demonstrators used

surgical masks but the fumes still effected them.

This

demonstration marked the first evidence of personal violence

•
•

against the activists.

As a black female demonstrator

attempted to enter the White Pantry, Quesenberry pushed her
back.6
The protests, however, were not over for that day.
Quite uncharacteristically, the CIP led another round of
sitting-in and picketing at the White Pantry between 7:30

•
•

and 8:30 that same evening.

Quesenberry once again replaced

the air conditioning with heat, and lit sulphur and
insecticide cakes.

Physical violence did not occur this
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time; perhaps because a squad of six police officers watched
.the proceedings with over 100 onlookers.

Afterwards,

Quesenberry told the media he would not serve blacks for
fear of losing his white customers.

Quesenberry maintained

this position despite the demonstrations and discussions
with representatives from the state and city human rights
commissions.

Howard W. McKinney, Executive Director of the

West Virginia Human Rights Commission (WVHRC), confirmed the
finality of Quesenberry's position by saying, "he wouldn't
serve Negroes unless there was a law that compelled him to
do so.117 Quesenberry was going to resist every step of the

•

way.
Despite Quesenberry's dogmatic attitude, however, the
CIP and fellow activists remained dedicated to the cause.

•

In order to ste� up the rate of demonstrations, the CIP
organized a demonstration at the White Pantry for 4:30 p.m.,
Thursday August 8.

•

However, the demonstration must not have

been a surprise to Quesenberry.

As five black youths, ages

14 to 20, picketed outside the White Pantry and fifteen to
twenty demonstrators began a sit-in, Quesenberry turned all

•

customers away, waited twenty minutes to clear out the
remaini�g diners, and closed the restaurant with a sign that
read:

•
•

"Closed for Cleaning Walls."

He then lit an

insecticide flare and set it in the center aisle of the
dining area where the demonstrators sat.

In moments the

restaurant cleared as the fumes proved to be too powerful to

•
•
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withstand.

One female demonstrator, Helen Willis, a West

Virginia State College student who was staying with an aunt

•

in Huntington for the summer, collapsed on the sidewalk just
outside the White Pantry's doors as a result of the fumes.
With tears streaming down her face, she gasped for air to

•

clear her lungs of the noxious vapors.

cab arrived, Willis had r�cuperated somewhat and was sent
home by her friends.

•
•

Though not seriously injured, the

incident with Willis escalated the tension in Huntington and
stiffened the resolve of the CIP activists and their
cohorts. 8
Two days later on Saturday, August 10, a group of 48
blacks and three whites participated in another
demonstration at the White Pantry.

•

This time, however,

Quesenberry resorted to a new tactic; he closed and locked
the restaurant's doors before any of the demonstrators could
enter.

•

By the time a taxi

When a white patron left the restaurant, however,

the door was temporarily left open and unguarded.

Four

black demonstrators managed to enter the White Pantry before
Quesenberry and two other white males secured the door and

•
•

prevented the other demonstrators from coming into the
establishment.

Shortly thereafter, Quesenberry permitted

three police officers to enter and he told them he was
temporarily closing the restaurant. The police officers
overcame their typical passivity and asked the black
demonstrators to leave the premises.

The four demonstrators

•
•
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peacefully complied with the request.

Once outside, these

four joined their compatriots in singing hymns, clapping

•

their hands, and marching through downtown Huntington .
Meanwhile, the White Pantry reopened.

But, upon the

demonstrators return to the restaurant, Quesenberry quickly

·•
•

reclosed his establishment.

For the next two and a half

hours the demonstrators picketed and sang outside the White
Pantry. 9

The police left after a while and white teenage
onlookers jeered and physically harassed the demonstrators.
In one incident a white teenager attempted to set fire to

•

one protester's sign with a match.

Quesenberry's resistance

had seemingly rallied several bigoted white youths into
opposing the CIP-led demonstrators with a potential.for

•

violence far greater than Quesenberry's. own personal abuse .
The summer heat of August only mimicked the seething racial
tensions and potentially violent atmosphere that boiled in

•

Huntington with the White Pantry at the center of the
vortex.

Budd Moser, a member of Huntington's City Council

and spectator at the August 10th protest, voiced what many

•

Huntingtonians began to sense when he called the conditions

surrounding the White Pantry an "explosive situation.1110
Moser and the other City Council members quickly

•
•

decided to try to ease the tension by voting unanimously at
a meeting on Monday, August 12, to make the City Council a
committee to facilitate the efforts of Huntington's Huma11
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�ight Commission (HRC) to resolve the situation.

The

Council rejected the pleas of Phil Carter and Bunche Gray to
take firmer action.

For some reason, the Council concluded

that it could not take legal action to outlaw segregation or
in any way force Quesenberry to integrate.

But the Council

expressed willingness to be a mediating body, and met with
Quesenberry in a ninety minute closed meeting on Wednesday,
August 14 at the Hotel Frederick.

The meeting was closed to

the public and to the CIP because Quesenberry would not
discuss the issue with blacks.

Members of the City Council

and Huntington's HRC attempted to convince Quesenberry to
alter his policy of not serving blacks at the White Pantry,
but this one-sided mediation process ended without
success. 11
The next day the Council released a statement which
promoted optimism that "an honorable and peaceable
settlement" would be found to resolve the situation.

Yet,

Quesenberry remained resolute in not serving blacks unless
required to do so by law, and the CIP had already called for
a demonstration for Saturday, August 17.

•
•

Gus Cleckley,

President of the Huntington Chapter of the NAACP, failed to
see the value of negotiations and declared, "Negotiations
are not necessary.

The matter is quite simple.

Quesenberry changes his policy, we will stop our
demonstrations.

If

If he does not, we will continue.1112

•
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•
•

The protests continued despite Mayor George Garner's
attempt to call a truce.

changing his policy on serving blacks and the CIP and
assorted groups refused to cancel the upcoming August 17
demonstration.

•

Quesenberry held firm in not

The forty minute demonstration was peaceful

as about 350 spectators, 50 police officers, and an unknown
number of plainclothes detectives inside and outside the
White Pantry watched the proceedings.

•

including four whites, marched along the sidewalk in front
of the White Pantry, clapping their hands and singing
religious and patriotic songs.

•

Fifty-three pickets,

Quesenberry did not close

the restaurant, but rather, stationed doorkeepers to permit
white customer's exit and entry and to keep out all blacks.
After concluding their pr�test, the demonstrators paraded

•

north on Ninth Street to Fourth Avenue and dispersed from
there.13
The CIP activists and their NAACP allies fulfilled

•

their committment to staging a demonstration, and the public
announcement of the demonstration focused further attention
on the White Pantry issue.

•

himself, the protesters could do nothing more than picket.
Quesenberry undoubtedly had the law on his side and would
have

•

Though Quesenberry had to behave

had the demonstrators arrested on trespassing and other

assorted charges if they had tried to sit-in or
share-in.

have

a

Si, the CIP and NAACP quietly picketed and reaped

further favorable publicity on the issue.

The demonstrators

•
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•
•
•

displayed the qualities of dignity, respectability and
non-violence while asking for nothing more than justice and
equality.

Quesenberry, like his southern counterparts, had

already developed a tarnished media and public i�age because
he resorted to vidlent tactics.

This is why approximately

350 spectators and dozens of police officers were present at
the August 17th White Pantry demonstration.

Though the

police would surely have arrested the demonstrators, the

•

objective of Huntington's political and business leaders was
to maintain the peace and everybody knew Quesenberry was
prone to violent acts.

•
•

public awareness of Quesenberry's bigoted serving policies
and public castigation for his contemptible role, he refused
to y1e
. ld 14
Quesenberry had plenty of white customers, especially
R.M. Hoisington, Huntington's City Manager, to back his
position.

•

Yet, even with this increasing

The City Council had gone on record as opposing

city employees frequenting establishments that practiced
racial discrimination.

Nevertheless, Hoisington continued

to eat at the White Pantry, and although he received harsh

•
•

criticism at the August 26th meeting of the City Council,
he ardently defended his right to eat where he wanted,

ironically a right often denied to blacks in Huntington.15
City Council soon began to realize that it was

incapable of resolving the specific problem ·with the White
Pantry and the general need for civil rights legislation.

•
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At a special meeting on Monday, August 19, the City Council
reiterated its inability or unwillingness "to pioneer in
civil rights legislation."

The Council did, however, go on

record with a resolution urging ''the state and federal
governments to adopt legislation without delay that will
provide the framework in which equal rights can be
accomplished and guaranteed.1116 The resolution further
stated that the City Council was willing to work with all
groups in seeking equality and civil rights.

In essence,

this was all the City Council believed it could do.
Technically, Quesenberry remained within his legal right not
to serve blacks, and Council was not about to go out on a
limb and pass an ordinance outlawing discriminatory
practices.

•

The issue had grown larger than the Council
could or would willingly handle.17
The CIP, however, attempted to force Huntington's City
Council to take positive action.

•

At a Council meeting on

August 26th protestors from the CIP and the NAACP made
allegations that the Huntington police and fire departments
and the Cabell-Huntington Health Department failed to act
properly concerning the White Pantry.

In particular, health

and fire codes and city ordinances had not been enforced by
the named agencies.

•

The Council authorized Mayor Garner to

create an investigation team to look into the charges .
Clearly, this was a clever attempt by the CIP and its allies
to pressure the city to force· Quesenberry to change his

,.

/, • '

'

; .:i
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•

policy.

As one The Herald Dispatch article correctly

analyzed:
In effect representatives of the Civic
Interest Progressives and the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored People asked the
city administration to use its powers to bring the
White Pantry management into. submission on the
issue of serving all persons regardless of race. 18

•

The city spurned the opportunity to take a positive
role when a report by interim City Manager James F. White
absolved the police, fire, and health departments of laxity

•

charges.

apparently did not want to use these agencies to correct
social injustices.

•

•
•
•

The CIP and the NAACP termed White's

report a "whitewash."

Mayor Garner did say the city would

investigate any allegations brought to the attention of the
.'

•

No legal injustices had occurred and the city

City Manager or any appropriate city department.

The

protestors wanted the appropriate officials available for
on-the-spot checks of the White Pantry.

The best the city

would do was to have officials at the scene of a
demonstration, if given ample warning.

This could not be

done because Quesenberry would then find out about the
demonstration and close the restaurant's doors.

The City

Council had effectively avoided taking an active stand in
the White Pantry case or on the civil rights issue.
than words were necessary.
to get help elsewhere.19

More

Consequently, the CIP would have

•
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•

Meanwhile, Quesenberry ushered in the next phase of the
White Pantry dispute when, for the first time, he had
demonstrators arrested.

•

On Saturday, August 24th, members

of the CIP and NAACP started a sit-in at 12:45 p.m. while
four picketers marched outside the restaurant.

About twenty

demonstrators remained within the establishment until 3:25

•

p.m. when a fumigant, released by Quesenberry, drove the
protesters out.

The sit-in demonstration resumed five

minutes later after Quesenberry left the door unguarded

•

which permitted the protestors' reentry.

Shortly

thereafter, Quesenberry used two "John Doe" (no specific
name) warrants for trespassing and had Gustavus Cleckley,

•

President of the Huntington Branch of the NAACP, and Cicero
Fain, Jr., a member of the CIP executive committee,
arrested.

Between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. Cleckley and Fain were

formally charged and processed by the police.

After posting

$500 personal property bonds, both left the police station
with a hearing on the charges against them scheduled before

•

Magistrate Keith Fulton at 2:00 p.m. on Friday, August 30.
Meanwhile, Cleckley and Fain's compatriots back at the White

•

Pantry placed wet towels and clothes over their faces in an
attempt to stave off the fumes, but by 4:10 p.m. the last of
the demonstrators staggered out of the restaurant coughing
and teary eyed . 20

•

The arrests escalated the next day as demonstrators
participated in a noon-hour sit-in.

Quesenberry swore out

•
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warrants that named Phil Carter, Michael Peters, Thomas
McGhee, Jr., Barbara Jean Bailey, Josephine Banks, and a

•

seventeen year old juvenile with trespassing.

the six demonstrators on their three block walk to the
police station to be booked.

•

A parade of protestors

carrying signs followed the arrested demonstrators to the
police station and marched outside the Seventh Street
entrance to the jail.

•

Police led

Of the six arrested for trespassing

only Carter wore handcuffs because the arresting officers
determined sufficient resistance on Carter's part.

While

the six were being booked on the trespassing charges, Paul

•

Duff, a short order cook for the White Pantry restaurant,
obtained warrants charging Carter and Cicero Fain, Jr. with
assault and battery.

•

Duff alleged that Carter and Fain
pushed him against a door which cut his back.21
After posting bond and receiving a September 5, 1963,

hearing date with Magistrate Johnny Miller, the

•

demonstrators returned to the White Pantry in time to
witness Fain's arrest on Duff's warrant.

Soon afterwards,

Carter released a written statement in conjunction with the

•

NAACP telling their version of the day's events.

The

statement accused the police of excessive use of force and
criticized the magistrates for issuing the warrants.

•
•

The

statement concluded with an announcement of a mass meeting
to be held later that evening.

About fifty people attended

the mass meeting at the Eighteenth Street Methodist Church
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to discuss what should be done concerning ·the White Pantry
situation.

Ultimately, the people at the meeting decided to

continue the demonstrations at the White Pantry.22

Shortly after the meeting, fifty people picketed the
White Pantry while three demonstrators who managed to get
inside before Quesenberry could lock the doors, sat quietly
inside the restaurant.

The protesters sang and chanted

while two police officers and several spectators stood by.
When the City Council began its meeting at 8 p.m., most of
the demonstrators left the White Pantry to attend the
meeting and the remaining protesters soon followed.

These

CIP and NAACP demonstrators went to the City Council meeting
to "focus attention" and urge the Council to do something
about the White Pantry situation, but this "audience

•

participation" yielded nothing.
its position.

Council had already stated

After the City Council meeting adjourned, the

demonstrators returned to picket the White Pantry until

•

about 10:30 p.m.

Despite being the third demonstration in

seven hours, all was peaceful.

However, the increased

number of demonstrations probably signified the frustration

•
•

of the demonstrators.

Quesenberry had found a new tactic by

using the legal system to his advantage to frustrate the CIP
and NAACP's integration efforts at the White Pantry.23
The structure· of the legal battle, however, quickly
changed when on Thursday, August 29 two events took place.
First, the Cabell County Prosecutors' Office asked for and

•
•
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received a postponement of the hearing on the trespassing
and assault and battery charges so a thorough study of the

•

law could be made.

Also, the delay gave Prosecutor Russell

C. Dunbar a chance to clear his workload involving the fall
term grand jury session of the Cabell County Pleas Court.

•

The delay in prosecuting the criminal charges against the
seven demonstrators shifted attention to the second event of
August 29.

•

Quesenberry retained the services of Quinlan,

Nelson and Williamson and petitioned for a temporary
injunction to forbid mass demonstrations, limit picketing,
and assure orderly conduct and the safety of employees of

•

the White Pantry restaurant.

The petition listed Gustavus

Cleckley, Philip Carter, Cicero Fain, Jr., Josephine Banks,
Barbara Jean Bailey, Michael Peters, Thomas McGhee, Jr., the
CIP and the NAACP as the respondents.

A hearing was

scheduled for Tuesday, September 3, before Circuit Court
Judge John W. Hereford.

•

Essentially, the setting and case

were exactly the same as in the Bailey's Cafeteria
injunction denial less than four months prior.

As in the

Bailey's case, attorney Herbert H. Henderson moved for a

•

temporary delay for additional time to prepare the
respondents' answer and defense.

Judge Hereford granted

Henderson's motion and moved the hearing to Friday,

•
•

September 6, 1963.

After being adjourned, Henderson

immediately went to work with James Gipson, his co-counsel
in the case, collecting affidavits and statements.24

•
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•

By Friday, Henderson and Gipson were ready to fight
Quesenberry's injunction request and Judge Hereford settled

•

in for two days of testimony.

Attorneys J.J.N. Quinlan and

Hiram Williamson presented their client's case during the
first day by calling eight witnesses:

•

Roba K. Quesenberry,

owner of the White Pantry, Frank Childers, cook and
assistant manager of the White Pantry, Zella Mays, a former
waitress at the White Pantry, John Foster, Huntington

•

Publishing Company photographer, Brook Davis, truck driver
for the General Highway service, James Barcus, truck driver
for a local meat packing firm, Sam McClain, an unemployed

•

construction worker, and Constable Lester Noel.

These

witnesses attempted to show that the demonstrators had
caused detrimental harm to Quesenberry and the White Pantry

•

restaurant.

Quesenberry testified to having suffered a $300

loss for July and a $500 loss for August because of the
demonstrations.

•

His own surveys indicated that his

customers would stop patronizing the White Pantry if
Quesenberry served blacks.

Consequently, Quesenberry

submitted he had had to close his restaurant on several

•

occasions.

The six other witnesses besides Constable Noel

alluded to instances where the demonstrators allegedly
blocked the sidewalk, entrance and bar stools, had attempted

•
•

to enter the 24 hour restaurant after it had closed, and
practiced disorderly conduct by pulling napkins from
dispensers and spraying catsup and mustard.

Constable

-
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Noel's testimony centered upon his arrest of the
demonstrators on trespass warrants.

At one point Judge

Hereford queried, "Do I understand you to say you served
trespassing warrants while the restaurant was locked and
those inside couldn't get out?"

Constable Noel replied that

the door was open at the time of the arrests, but "gas"
[sulfur and insecticide fumes] pervaded the restaurant.25
References such as Constable Noel's term "gas" were far
more specific in the testimony of the others concerning
Quesenberry's actions toward the demonstrators.

Before

burning sulfur, Quesenberry stated that he always warned the

•

demonstrators and used the substance only when nobody else
was in the establishment.

Quesenberry added that he only

used insecticides when necessary.

•
•
•
•

Either atLorney Henderson

or Gipson asked, "When do-you think they are necessary?"
Quesenberry coldly replied, "To get rid of insects."

In

short, blacks were no better than bothersome insects to
Quesenberry 26
Childers' testimony revealed his and Quesenberry's
disdain for blacks.

Childers stated he had blocked the

entrance on several occasions to prevent blacks from
entering, and acknowledged that Quesenberry lit sulfur, set
off insecticides, and had employees mop with an ammonia
cleaner as tactics to drive the demonstrators out of the
White Pantry.

Neither Childers nor Mays condemned the

restaurant's policy of not serving blacks.

Mays declared

•
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•
•

she had been instructed not to serve blacks.

readily confirmed Mays' testimony .and stated the
restaurant's policy was not to serve blacks.

Attorney

Gipson then asked Childers if the demonstrators' dress had
anything to do with this policy.

•

Childers

With blunt honesty

Childers replied, "No, it was because of the color of their
s k,in. 112 7
At the end of the testimonies on the petitioner's

•

behalf, attorneys Henderson and Gipson asked Judge Hereford
to dismiss Quesenberry's petition for an injunction on three
grounds.

•

First, the petitioner failed to prove the

defendents irreparably damaged Quesenberry or the White
Pantry.

Second, blacks are American citizens; therefore,

they are a part of the th� general public.

•

the general public, trespassing in a public establishment
during business hours (the White Pantry was open 24 hours a
day) was ridiculous.

•
•

As members of

Third, Quesenberry was attempting to

use "a court of law to enforce his own private convictions."
Attorneys Quinlan and Williamson opposed the respondents
motion for dismissal contending the case was a matter of
private property rights, not civil rights.28
The next• morning Judge Hereford ruled against the
motion for dismissal and sat back to hear the testimony of

•

five witnesses for the respondents and rebuttal testimony by
Quesenberry.

Phil Carter, the first witness to testify,

told of three acts of violence Quesenberry allegedly

•
•
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committed.

In the first incident, Carter testified that on

July 27, 1963, a sulphur candle fell over.

•

Quesenberry must

have thought Lawrence Williams, a black demonstrator and
student from Howard University who had ties with West
Virginia State College students, knocked the candle over.

•

As a result, Quesenberry forcefully grabbed Williams,
dragged him across the counter, placed a "large butcher
knife" against his chest, and ordered Williams to pick up

•
•

the sulphur candle.

As Carter testified:

.
"Williams offered no resistance and I was
afraid to say anything for fear he (Quesenberry)
would apply pressure on the knife. I'm reasonably
sure he could have �njured Mr. Williams if he had
applied pressure."2
Carter then recalled a second incident where
Quesenberry pulled Neal Shahan, a white instructor at an

•

Annapolis, Maryland high school with residences in Nitro and
Huntington, West Virginia, off a stool and beat Shahan's
head against a steel railing.

•

and climbed back upon a stool.

Shahan offered no resistance
Infuriated, Quesenberry

punched Shahan square on the jaw.

In a third incident

Carter told of Quesenberry beating and dragging

•
•

demonstrators by the hair from the White Pantry on August
17, 1963.

In subsequent testimony Georgeanna Higgins stated

that Quesenberry had grabbed her by the hair.

In rebuttal

testimony Quesenberry denied ever pulling anybody's hair and
he contended that the incident with Williams never took
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place.

However, he made no mention of the Shahan

.
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Gus Cleckley and Reverend Harry A. Coleman in their
testimonies both attested to being denied service at the
White Pantry, while Mayor Garner provided further evidence
of Quesenberry's racial discriminatory practices.

Garner

recounted futile attempts he and members of the City Council
and Huntington's Human Rights Commission (HRC) made to
persuade Quesenberry to integrate his restaurant.

At one

such meeting on August 14, Quesenberry refused even to enter
the room where negotiations were to take place because one

of the HRC representitives was a black male.31

By three p.m. Judge Hereford had heard enough testimony
and called for concluding iemarks.

•

After hearing closing

arguments, Judge Hereford denied Quesenberry's petition for
an injunction.

In his decision, Judge Hereford ringingly

condemned Quesenberry's petition and racial bigotry.

•

Chapter IV Appendix)

(See

Judge Hereford simply refused to

accept the argument of Quesenberry's attorneys who contended
that the White Pantry was private property and as such

•

Quesenberry could operate it as he saw fit.
did not see the restaurant in that light.

Judge.Hereford
According to his

interpretation, the White Pantry operated as a semi-public

•

establishment since the state licensed the restaurant and
officials from state or municipal government agencies
provided regular inspections.

•

Therefore, the White Pantry
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had to abide by the rules governing all public facilities,
not as a private establishment.

Consequently, blacks, being

a part of the general public, could not be denied service at
the White Pantry. 32
Judge Hereford legally found no grounds for the
injunction.

The petitioner never proved the allegations

against the demonstrators.

On the charge of obstructing

sidewalk traffic and blocking the entrance to the White
Pantry, Judge Hereford determined the allegation to be
unjustifiable because the police, present at every
demonstration, never found sufficient cause to make arrests.
Quesenberry had also alleged that the demonstrators
attempted to enter the restaurant en masse after the
establishment had closed.

•

Yet, according to the evidence,

the demonstrators always entered the building legally
through an open door.

The most serious of Quesenberry's

accusations was that the demonstrators grieviously harmed

•

the business of the White Pantry.
heavy financial losses.

However, Judge Hereford once again

ruled in favor of the respondents.

•
•
•

Quesenberry had cited
The judge concluded that

Quesenberry brought the damage of his business upon himself:
... I think the evidence clearly demonstrates that
the petitioner closed his restaurant voluntarily.
Nobody made· him do it. When the demonstrators
came in -- American citizens, if you please -
because he didn't like the c��or of their skin he
attempted to clo?e the door .

•
•
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Because he found no evidence of violence or property damage
on the part of the demonstrators, Judge Hereford could not

•

legally justify Quesenberry's request for an injunction.
This decision exemplified justice and the spirit of the
law.

. . .a court has to sit in a case such as this as a
court of conscience, a court of the heart, and
weigh not necessarily according to the cold
principles of law that the law side requires, but
according to the heart and soul and conscience of
the c��ncellor who presides over the trial of the
case.

•
•

As Judge Hereford, himself, noted:

Hereford's heart and sense of justice went to the CIP, the
NAACP, and the individual respondents in this case.

•

As in the Bailey's Cafeteria case, Judge Hereford gave
a sharp warning against violence.

This time, however, Judge

Hereford directed the bulk of the warning towards

•

Quesenberry. The demonstrators had heeded Judge Hereford's
previous warning and bravely acted in a respectable,
non-violent fashion.

•
•
•

Judge Hereford took notice of this

fact:
And so far as I could see every one of them were
passively resistant. They did a great deal
better, perhaps, than most people, because it is
apparent they were trained. They were trained in
carrying on this kind of a situation and handling
this kind of situation. And I would look a long
time to find a greater number of indignities
inflicted than were inflicted on them in that
restaurant, the White Pantry ....
But the sit-inners were non-violent, altho�§h
indignity after indignity was heaped upon them .
Phil Carter, in his testimony, had alluded to the
demonstrators' non-violent training and their dedication to

•
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this principle.

Quesenberry's violent tendencies, however,

were well documented.

•

So, Judge Hereford cautioned the

demonstrators to remain non-violent, and warned Quesenberry
.
. 1 ence. 36
not to provoke them 1n
. to reactionary v10
Though Judge Hereford's decision publicly scolded

•

Quesenberry for his segregationist policies and racist
attitudes, a law forcing him to integrate the White Pantry
did not exist.

•
•
•
•
•
•

Realizing.this, the CIP had already begun to

pressure West Virginia Governor William Wallace Barron to
issue an executive order forbidding racial discrimination in
all establishments having dealings with state agencies.
This would include any establishment which required
licenses, food permits, and Health Department inspection,
and would legally force places of public accommodations to
integrate, and virtually eliminate racial

segregation

Such an executive proclamation would carry the legal weight
necessary to compel Quesenberry to serve blacks.
On August 9, 1963, Governor Barron hinted that he might
issue an anti-discrimination order.

This vague suggestion

did not indicate what the executive order might cover .
Basically, Governor Barron attempted to ease increasing
racial tensions by temporarily pacifying black agitators in
Bluefield and Huntington.

In Bluefield, the NAACP had

threatened to boycott all establishments practicing racial
segregation.

Meanwhile, news of the sit-in demonstrations

at the White Pantry had rapidly spread across the state.

•
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•

The issue of civil rights was growing within West Virginia's
borders.

•

37

Eleven days later on August 20 the CIP, along with the
NAACP and ministers and students from the Huntington and
Charleston area, brought the civil rights· issue a little

•

closer to Governor Barron's attention.

Approximately 100

demonstrators protested segregation policies practiced and
supported by most of the governors, especially George

•

Wallace (Alabama), Ross Barnett (Mississippi), and Orville
Faubus (Arkansas), who attended the 29th annual meeting of
the Southern Governors' Convention held at the Greenbrier

•

Resort in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia.

the demonstration also had the effect of putting Governor
Barron on the spot.

•

He met the demonstrators at the gate of

the Greenbrier and told them he supported President John F .
Kennedy's civil rights bill and promised to issue an
executive order banning racial discrimination.

•

Later, in

his resort suite, Governor Barron indicated the executive
order would go as far as West Virginia's constitution and
laws permitted.

•

However,

Satisfied, the CIP activists and other

demonstrators left the Greenbrier convinced they would

receive what they so desperately wanted and needed.38

The CIP did not hear from Governor Barron again until

•

October 1, 1963, when he requested a meeting with the CIP.
Three officers represented the CIP:

Philip Carter, chair;

Gloria Austin, executive; and Pat Austin, executive

•
•
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secretary.

Accompanying them were Gustavus Cleckly,

president of the Huntington chapter of the NAACP; Dr. Paul

•

Stewart, professor of political science; Reverend Harry
Coleman of Ebenezer Methodist Church; Albert Calloway,
president of the West Virginia State College student body;

•

Mrs. Virgil Gilmore, president of the Charleston branch of
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE); and attorney James
Gipson, legal redress chair of the Huntington branch of the

•

NAACP.

For two hours, these civil rights leaders met with

Governor Barron and urged him to issue an executive order
which, according to Carter, would require "all

•

state-licensed businesses providing accommodation services
for the public to serve all persons without distinction.1139
Due to the "off-the-record" nature of their discussion with

•

Governor Barron, the civil rights activists did not make a
statement.

But, when Governor Barron announced that an

executive order would be forthcoming in the near future,

•
•
•

though still without revealing specific content, the CIP and
other civil rights activists went home anticipating a
sweeping victory for civil rights in West Virginia.4O
Unfortunately, for the activists, the ensuing result
was disappointing.

On October 17, 1963, Governor Barron

released his promised excutive order.

It was a repetition

of an executive order he released in January 1962,
prohibiting racial discrimination in employment by all state
agencies.

The new order did not mention public
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accommodations and in no way attacked segregation policies
in establishments having dealings with the state.

Reverend

Charles H. Smith of the First Baptist Church in Huntington
critiqued the executive order as the culmination of Governor
Barron's delaying tactics:

"Promises have been used for

public performances and procrastination had been used as a
catalytic weapon to slow down the ambition of those wanting
.
equa 1 treatment 1n every walk of 1.1fe. 1141 ,Seemingly,
Reverend Smith was correct in his assessment.

Governor

Barron had the opportunity and the power to make West
Virginia actively pursue civil rights.

•

Instead, he opted to

dodge his responsibility to the black citizens of West
Virginia.
To the CIP, Governor Barron's executive order was

•

nothing short of a "deterrent to better race relations in
the state of West Virginia.1142 The segregationists of West
Virginia could continue their discriminatory practices

•

•

without fear of state intervention, and Quesenberry
continued to refuse to serve black customers in his
restaurant . . With little alternative, the CIP determinedly
resumed sit-in demonstrations against the White Pantry on
October 18, 1963.

Quesenberry once again resorted to

lighting sulfur and setting off insecticides within the

•

,.

restaurant to drive out the CIP demonstrators.
efforts, nothing had changed. 43

Despite all .
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As Bunche Gray has said, "In order to keep a ,man down
, h h.1m. .,44
you have to stay there wit

Quesenberry was willing

to sacrifice his business, energy, and humanity to treat
blacks �s inferiors and to attack whites who befriended
blacks.

As has already been demonstrated, Quesenberry

willingly utilized violence and the activists never knew
what to expect.

Michael Gray noted that "you took your life

into your own hands" when the CIP activists protested at
White Pantry.

Reportedly Quesenberry tended to go after

whites who participated in the demonstrations with blacks;
this supposedly bothered him more than anything else.
However, ample evidence exists to suggest that Quesenberry
physically attacked black demonstrators as well.

For

example, one of the most r�counted acts of violence

•
•

perpetuated by Quesenberry involved Phil Carter.

of the demonstrations at the White Pantry, Quesenberry
wounded Carter with an electric cattle prod.45
Aside from dispensing verbal and physical abuse,
Quesenberry often sacrificed business to avoid
c6nfrontations with the CIP.

•
•

During one

As a result, the CIP depended

upon surprise attacks when dealing with Quesenberry and the
White Pantry.

Michael Gray described the process the CIP

went through in order to protest the discriminatory policy
at the White Pantry:
We could never let Quesenberry know when we were
coming because he would lock the door. So, we
would all meet on different corners and then
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slowly walk to the corner of Fifth Avenue and
Ninth Street ... and then when we turned the corner
we would run because someone passing would say,
'Here they come!' and he would lock the doors.
And he would pass up any more lunch crowd just to
keep us out. We would have to r�g and hit that
door and fill up all the booths.
To help facilitate gaining entry into the White Pantry,
the CIP had white supporters enter the restaurant.

When the

signal came, these white CIP activists blocked the
restaurant doors open with their bodies so Quesenberry or
others could not lock the black CIP demonstrators out of the
establishment.

Also, one of the demonstrators always had

the role of waiting at a nearby telephone and calling an

•

attorney, the newspapers, an d po 1.ice . 47
Once inside the White Pantry, CIP activists endured the
fumes from the sulfur and insecticides because nobody else

•

wanted to eat in a place full of bug spray and other noxious
effluviums.

Part of the strategy by the CIP was to let

Quesenberry damage his own business.

•
•

the CIP usually protested on Saturdays.

•

Besides freeing the

student demonstrators of school responsibilities, Saturdays
were the best day of business for the White Pantry.48
Yet, even the surprise sit-ins and picketing and the
CIP's tenacity failed to persuade Quesenberry to serve
blacks in his restaurant.

•

This helps explain why

A year after the CIP renewed

demonstrations against the White Pantry, the group was still
protesting the restaurant's policy of discrimination.

On

October 1, 1964, about twenty CIP activists entered the
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White Pantry and staged another sit-in.

Quesenberry then

c.losed the restaurant and ignited a substance which produced
sulfurous fumes.
the premise�.

All but four of the demonstrators exited

Infuriated that Phil Carter, Frank Helvey,

Danie Stewart and Pat McBrayer had withstood the sulphurous
fumes, Quesenberry, as he had in the past, went to a justice
of the peace and swore oµt warrants for their arrests on the
·charge of trespassing.

Within a few moments the police

removed the four remaining CIP demonstrators from the White
Pantry. 49
The CIP retaliated on Saturday, October 10, 1964 with
another, even larger demonstration.

About thirty students

from West Virginia State College joined Marshall University
students and CIP activists in sitting-in and picketing the

•

White Pantry.

Quesenberry closed the restaurant and sent

the employees out of the establishment while the
demonstrators remained within the restaurant for over an

•

hour.

However, for some reason, Quesenberry did not set off
fumigates or light sulfur this time.50
On October 23; 1964, Quesenberry spoke his piece as the

•

only witness to testify at the hearing for the four
demonstrators he had had arrested on October 1, 1964.
Justice of the Peace Johnny Miller and an audience comprised

•

mostly of MU students listened to Quesenberry's testimony .
Quesenberry stated that he did kick Phil Carter after Carter
came behind the counter, but otherwise he did nothing to

••
•
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provoke the protest.

On cross examination, Quesenberry

-confessed he did set off "spray bombs" after he closed the

•

White Pantry in the middle of the day.

When asked whether

the White Pantry was open 24 hours a day Quesenberry
affirmed that to be true "except when we close for certain

•

reasons."

In other words, the White Pantry c 1 osed when

blacks came to demonstrate.

More important though, for the

case at hand, Quesenberry never established a case proving

•

trespassing.

As a result, assistant prosecuting attorney

Edward V. Lee requested that the trespassing charges and a
peace warrant against Phil Carter be dismissed.

•

the Peace Miller concurred and Phil Carter, Frank Helvey,
Danie Stewart, and Pat McBrayer left the hearing cleared of
all charges brought against them.

•

Justice of

Quesenberry was once

again foiled in his effort to use the legal system to thwart
the CIP.51
Nevertheless, Quesenberry held firm in his refusal to

•

serve blacks until compelled to do so by law.

Having failed

to obtain such a law at the municipal and state levels, the
CIP had to wait for the United States Congress to pass the

•
•

Civil Rights Act of 1964 which made most forms of racial
discrimination unlawful . . The CIP actively supported this
legislation by participating in the March on Washington on
August 28, 1963, and participating in an April 11, 1964,
demonstration against West Virginia Senator Robert C. Byrd
52
to protest his non-support of the civil rights bill.

•
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•

Once the bill became law Quesenberry still hesitated to
comply.

The White Pantry did not serve blacks until

Quesenberry felt compelled by the Supreme Court decisions in

•

December 1964, which upheld the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Even then, quiet negotiations had to take place between
Quesenberry and Huntington Human Rights Commission (HRC)

•

members before he agreed to integrate.

Unsurprisingly,

however, Quesenberry flatly refused ever to serve Phil
Carter and apparently the HRC did not object because Carter
recalled. somehow being informed of this development.53 So,

•

it appears that Carter, without his permission, had to
forego his right as a citizen to eat at the White Pantry in

•

order for the restaurant to be integrated.

Carter never

intended to eat at the White Pantry, but he still has strong
feelings about the treatment he received:

•

So what the Hell. I had no intention of going in
there in the first damn place, except it was the
principle .... I resented the negotiations that went
on, however. To...negotiate me out as a
settlement, that I deeply resented. Because I
felt that was the epitomy of siploitation and
that's exactly what was done.

•
•
•

I
I

Carter abided by his exile and everybody who knew of the
arrangement, probably the HRC members, the black community,
the white activists,·and the CIP, let it stand.
Though the White Pantry eventually integrated,
Quesenberry's resistance had its impact on the Huntington
community.

Carter believed that "the White Pantry became a
symbol; it was a rallying point for whites.1155 Carter said

•
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

this happened because of the pers�nality of Roba Quesenberry
who, like George Wallace in Alabama, became a symbol of
white bigotry.

Carter believed that Quesenberry had a major

impact on Huntington:
You find every once in a while some center of
opposition, and I think that [the White Pantry]
was the center of street oppostion. The center of
legal opposition was Bailey's. And when they
realized, Hell, we can't win this and besides it's
going to hurt our damn business if we don't get
our act straight, they decided 'okay, we'll cool
it.' The other guy [Roba Quesenberry] said no; he
was making a stand. And so he made a stand. What
it did was really crystallize the depth of racism
in West Virginia in this area. Right there on
that coiner. It actually crystallized it for
everyone to see very, very clearly. And, it also
illustrated the paucity of white leadership in
responsible positions, and the passive support of
masses of whites that really existed where whites
openly and overtly challen§gd black rights to eat
in public accommodations."
Quite simply, by resisting integration and baring his
prejudices, Quesenberry mobilized the racist attitudes that
existed in Huntington into a tacit anti-civil rights street
opposition capable of violence.

Comparisons between

Huntington and Mississippi and between Quesenberry and
George Wallace, segregationist Governor of Alabama, openly
circulated.

In his decision on Quesenberry's petition for

an injunction, Judge John W. Hereford noted that "it would
be difficult to find, outside of the State of Alabama and
the executive mansion of that state, a greater display of
prejudice and hate than has been shown by the evidence in
this case.1157 The CIP had activated its handful of

•
•
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supporters and Quesenberry effectively crystallized
opponents to the CIP and civil rights.

•

However, the

majority of Huntingtonians continued to ignore the problem.
Because, as Bunche Gray declared, "the average person in
Buntington saw nothing wrong with it [segregation], they

•

pretended they didn't know...that blacks were being kept

out.1158

Nevertheless, the CIP, through its protest

•

demonstrations, made Quesenberry, Floyd Walker, and other
Huntington business people catering to the public, deal with
the issue of civil rights and, except Quesenberry, change

•

their policies.

Though the CIP-led protests against the

White Pantry did not force Quesenberry to integrate, the
demonstrations did help persuade other Huntington businesses

•

to integrate when CIP activists visited.

,.

Pantry happen to them, most, if not all, Huntington

Because business

owners did not want to have what was happening at the White
establishments voluntarily eliminated segregation policies
to avoid conflict with the CIP.

For example, the Orpheum

Theater closed down for a short time for renovation during

•
•

the CIP's existence.

When the theater reopened, blacks and

whites entered the same main entrance and sat where they
pleased rather than the previous two separate entrances and
blacks relegated to the balcony.59
Through willingness to initiate protests and to take a
stand in the struggle for civil rights, the CIP sparked the

•
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•

movement to integrate Huntington's business community.

The

GIP forced the people of Huntington to take notice of civil

•

rights and pressured them to change their discriminatory,
status quo practices and attitudes.

Every establishment

engaged by the GIP activists discontinued racially

•

discriminatory practices, even, with a little help from the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the United States Supreme
Court, the White Pantry.

•
•
•
•
•
•

Truly, it can be said that black

and white activists, including the GIP, made life a little
better for blacks in Huntington.

Problems still existed,

but segregation in.public accommodations was not a major
any longer. 60
barr1er
.
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Chapter IV Appendix

•

Portion of Judge John W. Hereford's
Decision on September 7, 1963 in
Quesenberry v. Cleckley

•

I will say here and now as I said a few months ago in
case of like kind that I don't think any lawyer could
thei
ano
the
fact that the Supreme Court of the United States has
dispute
by its decisions said.that the American Negro has civil rights
the same as any other citizen: that they are citizens, and that
the spirit of the Constitution of the United States guarantees to
them the same rights that it guarantees to me.
And yet, in spite of the spirit of the Constitution and the
spirit expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States with
relation to the Constitution, there are still little people in
this world that would still deprive the American Negroes,.who are
American citizens the same as I am, of the rights that were
promised them 100 years ago but have been denied them for 99 to
100 of that period since the promise was made .
What this petitioner is doing is depriving the American
Negroes of Huntington or elsewhere from coming into his place of
business and enjoying the same privileges of his fine restaurant
-- although I have never been in it I am sure it is a fine one -
declining to allow a person, just because his skin is a different
color than mine, refusing to allow him the same privilege that I
would be allowed if I walked into his place of business.
I say that is something that the Supreme Court has, I think
very definitely, watered down and placed in the area of
condemnation. And if what the petitioner is doing was done by a
governmental agency, by a state, by a city, by a county, they
would be enjoined immediately from doing such a thing, from
practicing segregation in a business that is operated by
taxation. And yet the petioner would come into this court and
ask this court to protect him in his attempt to do that which the
Supreme Court of the United States says that the state couldn't
do or the county couldn't do.
Now, let us concede that as an American citizen he has
rights the same as everybody else, and he has a right to be
foolish if he wants to: he has a right to take the position that
he is not going to permit integration in his place of business:
he has a right to do all of those things. And I would be the
first to accord him those rights. But I am saying now I am
holding that he has no right to come into a court of law and ask
me as judge of this court, in a court of chancery, in a court of
conscience, in a court of the heart -- he has no right to come
into this court and ask me to protect him in doing something that
the Constitution of the United States, according to the Supreme
Court, says is not proper and could not be done by a governmental
agency
So this court is not about to lend its good offices to help
this petitioner or any other petitioner to enforce something that

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and the decisions
the Supreme Court of the United States.
And I am going to go further and hold in this proceeding
when
a man such as this petitioner gets a license from the
thit
e
of
West
Virginia and from the City of Huntington -- and the
t
Sta
eourt takes judicial notice of that fact -- to serve the public
iP the form of furnishing a place for people to eat, and when
that business that he is operating has to be inspected by the
health department of the city, they have to make an examination
of the cleanliness of the place, the toilet facilities, the
cleanliness of the kitchen, they have to go in there and inspect
it and place a rating on the business, and that has to be done by
a public official, and that public official is paid by taxpayer's
money, including taxes that are paid by the Negroes, and then
make the Negroes help pay for inspecting a restaurant that only
white people can eat in and that the door is slammed in the face
of the Negroes is, I think, unreasonable and unpardonable.
I think, in addition to that, that there have to be fire
inspections that have to be conducted by public officials that
are paid by the taxpayers, including taxes that are paid by the
Negroes too. And to tax the Negro in order to pay the salaries
of somebody that has to inspect a business from which the Negro
is shut out, is not good Americanism, is not Constitutional, and
is contrary, in my way of thinking to the laws of the great State
of West Virginia.
So I am about to say and am saying that when the State of
West Virginia issues a license and the City of Huntington issues
a license to do business and serve the public, that the Negro is
as much a part of the public as the white man, and that they
would be obligated to serve him too.*
*For citation see footnote number 32 of this chapter .
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Chapter V
Moving the Movement to MU
During the struggle for civil rights in Huntington, the

•

CIP did not overlook the need for action in its own backyard
-- Marshall University.

The CIP began focusing attention on

Marshall's campus in the spring of 1964.

•

Huntington's businesses had been integrated by this time,
but the battle over integration still raged at the White
Pantry.

•

Most of

Nevertheless, the CIP felt compelled to attempt to

improve MU's campus environment and continued for a year to
tear down the facade of racial harmony at Marshall.

The CIP

activists were by then seasoned civil rights veterans· and

•

brought this experience with them to the MU campaign.
However, they also had acquired a reputation in some circles
as troublemakers and a number of enemies who favored vague

•

promises over direct action tactics.

The University's

administration and Student Senate had taken this position
from the start of the CIP's agitation in Huntington.
Gaining their support to fight campus discrimination proved
to be difficult to obtain.
Even the need for CIP action at MU was and has been

I
I

!.

disputed.

In 1981, Charles H. Moffat, retired Chair of the

History Department, in his book, Marshall University:

An

Institution Comes of Age, 1837-1980, described race

1·I

relations at Marshall University (MU) in the early and mid
1960s as rather serene:
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The Smith administration [1946 to 1968] had
brought about a relatively peaceful transition in
the evolution of race relations at Marshall, an
achievement that represents a historical
watershed; however, there would be troubled days
ahead for President Smith's successor, as
intransigent black students, acting in concert
with the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)
made demands upon the university administration. 1
Moffat referred in this passage to President Stewart H.
Smith's ability to keep a lid on civil rights activism in
the early to mid 1960s.

Moffat clearly implied that Smith

and his administrators were predominantly responsible for
improving MU's environment for black students through an
evolutionary or gradual approach.

•
•

Smith's leadership,

according to Moffat, was the key to a moderate integration
of blacks into student life at MU, at a pace determined by
Smith, the MU community and the Huntington community.
Yet, because of the practices and attitudes of the
groups the CIP challenged, all was not as serene as Moffat
portrayed and Smith would have liked.

Moffat indicated an

awareness of this when he added the qualifier "relatively"
to his phrase "peaceful transition."

•
•

However, Moffat still

missed the mark with his analysis of race relations at
Marshall.

His portrayal is a classic example of William

Chafe's concept of the "progressive mystique" whereby people
believed that a paternalistic white establishment took care
of blacks and that a willingness to discuss issues, not to
take action, determined how progressive a person was.2

•
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•

If Moffat's interpretation had been entirely correct,
civil rights groups such as the CIP would have been
unnecessary at MU.

•

the truth.

However, nothing could �e further from

The CIP's very existence, created as a response

to local and campus problems, disproves Moffat's scenario.
For example, .Smith preferred to operate discreetly behind

•

the scenes with little disruption of daily operations.

But,

while his methods might have been appropriate for the 1950s,
they were totally inadequate for the needs and demands of

•

the early to mid 1960s.

As a challenge organization, the

CIP believed in creating public awareness by publicizing an
issue in order to force people either to support civil

•

rights or to contribute to the problem by doing nothing or
worse.

In all probability, a driving force such as the CIP

was necessary to push a generally complacent Marshall

•

University more quickly toward racial justice.
In 1962, Smith claimed that MU was far ahead of
Huntington in the matter of racial integration, and quite

•

possibly it was, but only in the sense that blacks had
attended Marshall since i954 .. However, integration at MU

•
•

did not eliminate discriminatory practi�es and attitudes,

I

and Phil Carter believed that "Marshall's administration and
leadership was totally unresponsive" to black students'
concerns.

To understand Carter's and the other CIP

activists' position concerning the necessity for the CIP, an
.
analysis of the pre-CIP Marshall environment coupled with

101
the CIP's impact on creating awareness of racial injustice
is essential.

administration as personified by Smith and the attitudes of
the faculty and representatives in student government before
and after the' CIP's challenge to fight discrimination and
negative attitudes need careful examination.3
Most institutional policies reflect the values of its
leaders, and MU was no exception.

"President Smith," wrote

Charles Moffat, "was consistently in the vanguard as a
vigorous champion of human rights.114 Smith did support the
rights of blacks to enroll at MU even before the Supreme
Court outlawed school segregation in Brown� Board of
Education� Topeka (1954).

Blacks matriculated into the

Graduate School at MU in the fall of 1951.

•

However, a 1949

federal court order forcing the University of Kentucky to
integrate its Graduate School and a decision by the West
Virginia Board of Education in 1950 permitting resident

•
•
•

I•
I

I

In particular, the posture of MU's

blacks to matriculate into the graduate schools at the
institutions of higher learning in West Virginia provided
the context within which Smith's decision was made, and
would seem to suggest he was a follower, not a leader.5
With the Brown decision in 1954, the doors to an
undergraduate education opened to people of all races.
Throughout the 1950s a small but steady influx of black
students enrolled at MU.

Also, Moffat approvingly asserted

that "Smith attempted to eradicate every vestige of

•
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discrimination on the campus.116

To corraborate this, Moffat

cited Smith's ending of an annual black-face minstrel show

•

performed by the campus chapter of Omicron Delta Kappa, a
national leadership honorary.

Regarding this incident,

Moffat quoted Smith as saying the black-face minstrel show

•

"ridicules and exaggerates the shortcomings of the Negro
race.117 Obviously, Smith believed either consciously or
unconsciously, that blacks as a race did have shortcomings.

•

Nevertheless, Moffat concluded that Marshall had a "quiet
and successful social revolution" in which its
"administrators deservedly cherished a feeling of

•

self-satisfaction about their own success in effecting

"8
racia
. 1 a d.Justment....

Smith did play a significant role in integrating MU.

•
•
•

Yet, Marion T. "Bunche" Gray stressed that Smith was a good
man but "out of touch" with the problems and needs of MU's
black students in the early Sixties.9 Phil Carter called
Smith "one of the ultra neutrals which [sic] contributed to
our problem.111° Carter elaborated:
This concept of really being overly fair, and
really being fundamentally neutral and really
being color blind [was a farce]. Well, first of
all, it wasn't an equal situation. [It] was not a
neutral environment. And it certainly wasn't
color blind. So people who put on those blinders
and used that rhetoric and [took] that stance,
contribute to a worsening of the situation, rather
than to try to recognize that there are problems,
face up to them, and then identify the problem and
then work on the solution... There were serious
problems on this campu 11 with student attitudes and
perceptions of blacks.
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Carter thought that Smith failed to initiate action to
r�ctify the problems present on MU's campus.

Smith was the

leader; he was supposed to have sensitivity and vision.
Most importantly, he had the power to do something about

:
12
. .
. 1 d.1scr1m1nat1on.
rac1a

Charles Aurand, a white minister

at St. Paul'� Lutheran Church and former student at MU,
remembered Smith as being morally and ideologically opposed
to racial discrimination, but feared going too far to oppose
it.

"Publicly he always did the right thing, and, I think

that he was one of those whites, which many of us were, who
wanted the right thing done by blacks.

But, he never felt
that he wanted to go too far out on a limb for it.1113
Michael Gray, a native black Huntingtonian and member
. 1
of the CIP, recalled that "Smith was about status quo." 4
Consequently, the black students never felt they could count
on President Smith to deal with their concerns.

•
•
•

Gray

suggested that most black students realized that, in
general, some university presidents were far worse than
Smith, "but as black students we damn sure didn't consider
.
1115
S m1t
. h very progressive.

The black students knew of other

university presidents who vigorously attacked racial
discrimination and sought a better learning environment for
all students.

Michael Gray, Phil Carter, and probably most

of MU's black students in the 1960s, believed that Smith did
not actively seek to create a better campus environment for
black students.

Smith intellectually and morally condemned
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racial discrimination and made gestures in that direction,
but he maintained a neutrality that did not all�w him to
deal with the problems and needs of the black students.
Perhaps unintentionally, Smith's neutrality actually hurt
black students, hence the necessity of a challenge
organization like the CIP to prod him into awareness of and
possible action on civil rights and racial justice issues.
Unfortunately, President Smith never rose to meet the
CIP's challenge.

Though many people viewed Smith as a

progressive liberal in the vanguard of civil rights, he
never demonstrated it in his dealings with the CIP.

•

Smith

acknowledged the need for civil rights and signed all of the
appropriate documents in compliance with the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, but tended to rest upon the laurels of his past

•

achievements and perpetuated a "go slow" mentality favoring
the status quo.
been made.

•

To Smith, significant changes had already

For further growth, however, attitudes needed to

be changed, and he seemed to be willing to wait lifetimes to
give people time to alter their racial perceptions.

As a

result, President Smith, as shall be noted time and again,

•
•

failed to initiate or take concrete action designed to fight
.
. .
.
. 1 equa 1·1ty. 16
d1scr1m1nat1on and promote racia
In general, the faculty at MU followed President
S�ith's lead and assumed an anti-discrimination but neutral
posture.

For example, in October of 1962, shortly after

racial violence erupted at the University of Mississippi,

•
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•

the faculty passed unanimously a resolution which in part
read:
In view of our special responsibility to
contribute to the well-being of our students,
and ...because we believe there are no valid
grounds for racial discrimination ...the faculty of
Marshall University deplores all acts of racial
disc:imi�ati�� and urges their prompt
termination .

•
•

The author of the resolution, Paul Alexander, instructor in
Political Science, stated that the resolution sought to

•

"indicate the moral support of the faculty for those
students who were seeking to reduce racial
d.

. . ·
.
.,18
iscrimination.

•

However, approval of the resolution did

not lead to any apparent positive action by faculty on
behalf of black students.
Relatively few faculty members met the CIP challenge.

•
•

But, on occasion, the CIP activists turned to Simon Perry,
Bill Cook and Paul Stewart for advice.

These professors

provided a willingness to speak out, using the language the
CIP felt appropriate.19 On advising the CIP activists,
Perry said, " ... I tried to make them feel that there was a
vast social science literature that was supportive of what

•

they were doing."

Perry and a few other professors provided

"positive reinforcement" to the CIP activists during and
.

•
•

.

.
.
d emonstrat1ons
a f ter th e1r
1n H unt1ngton an d on campus. 20

Bunche Gray told of a time when Cook operated a public
relations office and had criticized the Huntington Chapter
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored

•
•

106
People (NAACP ) for its format and tactics.

When Bunche

Gray, chair of the Membership Committee for the local

•

chapter, asked for his help, he declined because he feared
losing his white clients.

Yet, white liberals like Cook

could or would go only so far in backing their convictions.

•
•

Cook, an economics professor, played a very important role
for black students and the CIP.

Cook and his wife opened

their home to the CIP, and both raised questions and
suggested books and articles to read.21
Other than these primary collaborators, however, MU's
faculty members' contributions were minimal at best.

•

young professors may have feared not getting tenure, but
innumerable others apparently just did not want to rock the
boat.

•
•

Some

The faculty was basically silent on the roles played

by Perry, Cook and Stewart in support of the CIP.

The lack

of either verbal support or criticism seems to indicate
indifference and possibly disdain by much of the MU
faculty. 22
In an attempt to understand and improve black student
life at MU, before the CIP's emergence, Student Senate

•

Speaker Walt Crosby created a committee in 1961 to
investigate practices of racial discrimination on or near
the MU campus.

Carolyn Karr (chair), William Calderwood,

Aubrey King, and Tom Stafford served as committee members.
The committee investigated allegations supplied by black MU
students.

Once a charge was made, the committee sought to
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determine the policies of the off campus establishment in
question, why the policies existed, and if change was
shortly forthcoming in the establishments' policies.

On

October 10, 1962, the committee presented its findings to
the Student Senate.

Discriminatory practices abounded.

Campus Sundries, a small fast food restaurant which catered
to MU students, sold to blacks but prohibited them from
sitting at the counter.

Colonial Lanes (bowling alley), the

American Legion Hall, and Camden Park refused blacks
admittance into their establishments on an individual basis,
but did permit entry if the black was a part of a large and

•

predominatedly white group.

The Palace Theater and El Gato,

a drinking establishment frequented by white Marshall
students, completely denied service to blacks.

•
•
•
•

As a result,

the committee concluded:
...discriminatory practices do exist at
establishments near the campus and in those
establishments which college students frequent as
a source of recreation and diversion .... Such
practices are not enticing to a Negro athl 23 e or
scholar who might want to attend Marshall .
Considering the negative impact of such pervasive
discrimination on MU students, the committee made two
recommendations.

First, the committee recommended the

Student Senate create a permanent Human Rights Commission.
This body would study the relationship between all MU
students and the Huntington community, study the
relationship between black MU students and the Huntington

•
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•

community, and present findings and coordinate activities
with the Huntington Human Rights Commission (HRC).

•
•

Second,

the committee proposed that the Student Senate somehow show
its displeasure towards establishments discriminating
against black MU students.24
After the committee presented its report and
recommendations to the Student Senate, Senator William
Calderwood, also a member of the committee, proposed that

•

the Student Senate act upon the committee's recommendations .
An hour long debate ensued.

Clark Todd and Claren Brooks

led the opposition against forming a human rights

•

commission.

The opponents argued that the Student Senate's

jurisdiction ended with the campus boundary, and besides,
Huntington's HRC did not need "junior adults" to interfere

•

in matters the city commission was perfectly able to handle .
Proponents, led by Aubrey King, countered by arguing that
the Student Senate's jurisdiction extended to any thing or

•
•
•

place effecting MU students and students should be involved
in community matters because they were the future civic
l�aders.

King added that the student commission would

investigate grievances brought to its attention, including
any against campus groups, sororities, and fraternities.
However, the student commission could only study charges of
discriminatory practices, and did not have the power to take
action
to reso 1 ve d'1scr1m1natory
problems. ZS
. .
.

•
•
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Apparently, King's arguments proved persausive enough
to help attain a favorable ten to eight vote to create the

•

student commission on a one year trial basis under the
direction of the Publications and Public Relations
Committee.

•

Student Body President Gary McMillan set up a

special Parliamentary Affairs Committee to study the Human
Rights Commission.

The Parliamentary Affairs Committee

consisted of six student senators (three pro and three con):

•

Tom Dunfee, William Calderwood, Mike Carroll, Ivan Ash,
Patty Bartlett, and Claren Brooks.

The major product of

this student commission was the previously cited report

•

delivered to the Student.Senate by Stuart Thomas and
apparently ignored by President Smith.26
Nevertheless, the Student Senate had taken a little

•

initiative in recognizing that racial discrimination existed
and adversely effected all MU students, particularly the
black students.

•

However, the student Human Rights

Commission had no real power or influence and consequently
proved to be useless.

Yet, by following the example of

President Smith and the faculty, this is what the Student

•

Senate advocated.

Actions such as anti-discrimination

statements, resolutions, and the creation of a powerless
commission could do very little to

•
•

alleviate racial

discrimination in Huntington or improve the campus
environment for black MU students .
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After the formation of the CIP, MU's Student Senate did
not act on human rights or racial discrimination until
November 6, 1963, when it abolished the one year old student
Human Rights Commission.

The coordinator and former

opponent of the student commission, Claren Andrews nee
Brooks recommended the dismantling of the commission.

She

cited that only three problems had come before the
commission and the one year trial period was over.

Simon

Perry, the advisor to Student Government, ardently argued
against getting rid of the Human Rights Commission, but to
little avail.

A compromise, however, was made to transfer

the commission's power to investigate allegations of racial
discrimination to the Student Government Affairs
·
.
Committee. 27

•
•
• I
•

Pat Austin delivered the CIP's response to these
actions in a letter in The Parthenon.

Austin and the CIP

looked at the student Human Rights Commission as a gesture
of good faith that civil rights would be forthcoming.
Austin wrote:
The road to freedom...is marked with guide
posts saying, 'Go Slow, Negro,' meaning 'Don't Go,
Negro.' Every so often the weary traveler meets a
benevolent being who hands him a token of freedom.
The traveler, bent with the age of 100 years,
accepts the token as a ray of hope, and trudges on
in the faith that he will someday attain the
actual torch of freedom.
Marshall
former Human Rights Commission ·was
such a token.

2�
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•

Austin acknowledged the shortcomings of the student
commission, particularly its powerlessness, but urged the

•

,.
•

Student Senate to reconsider the abolishment of the Human
Rights Commission.

She thought the student commission

should not only have been kept, but its powers expanded
since racial discrimination still abounded in Huntington and
at MU.
existed.

Thus, the need for the Human Rights Commission
This, Austin believed, should have been the

criteria for keeping the student commission, not how many
allegations it received.

Also, she insisted the Human

Rights Commission could have been a potential mechanism for

•
•

change:
A student Human Rights Commission could be an
effective instrument of justice with the
appointment of persons possessing strong
convictions, who are not afraid to stand2�nd be
counted in the battle for human dignity.
Austin's letter had no apparent impact upon the Student
Senate; however, the incident caused the CIP to direct some

•

attention toward forcing the all-white Student Senate to
take a stand on the issue of civil rights and establish
itself as a friend or enemy of MU's black students.

•

Before

Thanksgiving break in 1963, the Student Senate passed
Resolution 107 which asked all Marshall students to boycott

any establishment which practiced racial discrimination.30

•

Senator Frank Varacalli introduced this resolution .
However, Varacalli was only a partner in the promotion of
this resolution; Danie Stewart, sophomore class president
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and CIP activist, co-authored the resolution and initially
played a quiet, behind-the-scene role.

So, Varacalli was

essentially the front for the CIP efforts to get the Student
Senate to take a stand on civil right� and racial
1
d.1.scr1.m1.nat1.on.
. .
.
3 ·
With the initial passage of Resolution 107, the CIP
appeared to have won an important moral battle, i£ not an
enforcable, practical remedy for discrimination.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

However,

Ken Gainer, Student Body President, vetoed the resolution
two weeks later, asserting that:
while I am personally opposed to
discrimination, at this time I feel that the realm
of our legislative power as a Student Government
ends when we leave the campus or any property
owned or rented by Marshall University for the
Student Body .
. Secon12Y, I feel that the resolution is
ambiguous.
When asked to elaborate on his veto statement, Gainer said
that the phrases like "racial discrimination" and "public
establishment" were vague and made the resolution unclear in
its purpose.

Gainer rambled on in his reasoning to note

that specific establishments were not cited in the
resolution, contributing to its general vagueness.

Gainer

concluded his assessment of Resolution 107 by questioning
whether the resolution was "really the feeling of the entire
student body, rather than just the 12 members of the Student
Senate who approved it.1133

•
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e

Frank Varacalli attacked Gainer's veto and his reasons
for it:

•

•

...any president who uses his powers for such ·
discriminatory ends reflects a degree of prejudice
of his own.
Nowhere in this resolutio� do I see any
ambiguity. I repeat that discrimination even
possibly exist�4within the walls of the Student
Senate itself .
Danie Stewart, who viewed the struggle for racial justice at
MU as inextricably linked to the Huntington community

•

environment, also voiced resentment at Gainer's appraisal
and veto.

Stewart did not agree with Gainer's assessment of

ambiguous language and insisted that most of MU's students

•

supported the legislation.
very astute observation.

Most importantly, Stewart made a

Resolution 107 was a request, not

a demand that MU students avoid establishments practicing

•

racial discrimination.

A ban on establishments catering to

MU students and practicing racial discrimination could not
realistically be enforced.

•

However, the resolution only

asked students not to patronize discriminating
establishments.35
The resolution represented a noble symbolic gesture

•

capable of tremendous results.

The resolution, if complied

with by the student body, had enormous potential impact.
Blacks elsewhere, in the 1955-56 Montgomery bus boycott, for

•

example, had successfully utilized economic boycotts to
secure objectives.

Resolution 107 could have resulted in a

similiar situation�

The black student population was not
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large enough to use economic boycotts successfully.
However, MU's white student population was more than
sufficient to sustain such a tactic.

Had Gainer not vetoed

the resolution and had enough of the MU student body
complied, the businesses depending heavily on MU students
might have been forced ta alter their discriminatory
practices.

Gainer understood and feared these implications

when he quipped, "This is just leaving us wide open. 1136
The resolution still had a chance even after Gainer's
veto.

A week later, Varacalli and Stewart tried to garner a

two-thirds majority in the Student Senate to override

•

Gainer's veto.

After Varacalli resubmitted the resolution

with exactly the same wording, Stewart went to work.
According to a The Parthenon article, Stewart delivered "a

•

,.

dramatic and emotion-packed speech, which rang with sounds
of the Declaration of Independence and the American ideals
.
o f th e American
way.... 1137

Apparently, Stewart's speech was

a fine piece of oratory that even won praise from members of
the opposition.

However, Stewart's effort was not enough.

Sally Montgomery, graduate senator from Huntington, led the

•

opposition forces in defeating the effort to override the
veto.

Montgomery argued that "the proposed resolution in

reality was foolish for 'talking down' to Marshall students,

•

and to the Student Senate, itself . 1138

Certainly, Stewart

did not consider seeking justice and equality "foolish."
Nevertheless, the Student Senate, in not overturning

•
•
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Gainer's veto, failed to join the CIP in the fight against
racial discrimination and set a negative example for the

•

rest of the student body .
Six months later, Stewart once again forced the all
white student senators to take a stand on civil rights.

•

At

the May 20, 1964, meeting of the Student Senate, John Cross
introduced a resolution to condemn the practice of racial
discrimination and to support the civil rights legislation

•

being considered in the United States Senate (the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).

Then Cross turned the floor over to

Stewart who thereafter carried the struggle for the

•
•

resolution.

Student Body President Dick Cottrill suggested

that "Danie Stewart has done it again.
issue right in our laps.1139

He's thrown this

This time Stewart had a little more success.

He

asserted that most MU students supported the resolution and
the Student Senate should vote according to the students'

•

wishes.

Senat�r Dean Thompson led the opposition forces

against the resolution, arguing that he and other student
senators had not had sufficient time to examine the

•

resolution thoroughly.

This was in spite of a one week

notice that the resolution would be introduced and every
student senator had been urged to become familiar with it.

•

Despite stall tactics such as this, a vote was taken on
Cross' resolution which passed ten to eight.

More than

likely, Dick Cottrill's approval of the resolution helped

•
•

116
push it through the Student Senate.

When leaders like

Cottrill provided support, others followed their lead.

•

So,

Stewart had Cottrill's help in convincing his fellow student
senators to support the resolution.

In addition, Cross'

resolution was not quite so controversial as Resolution 107

•

which had recommende.d taking a somewhat more active stance.
Even so, for the vote to be so close, considerable
opposition apparently existed in the Student Senate

•
•

concerning the concept of civil rights, let alone doing
anything about the problem.

Varacalli may have been correct

in his suggestion that discrimination existed "within the
walls of the Student Senate itself .1140
But, this is not to imply a total lack of sympathy for
the goal of the CIP by members of the Student Senate.

•

Varacalli, John Cross, and Danie Stewart have already been
mentioned.
list.

•

One can also add Richard "Rick" A. Diehl to the

Both Diehl and Stewart were activists and core

members of the CIP.

Many times they participated side by

side in demonstrations, and they often prodded the Student
Senate to fight racial discrimination.

•
•

Frank

In May 1965, Diehl

publicly announced his resignation from the Student Senate
in a letter in The Parthenon.

As part of his letter, Diehl

compared the CIP and Student Senate, institutions with which
he w a s f am i 1 iar .

He noted that " the Stu·d e nt G o v ernment is

much more efficient in its undertakings than is the CIP.
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The CIP's undertakings, however, are much more significant
than the Student Government's.1141
Diehl also believed the CIP was more democratic and
more politically responsible than MU's Student Government.
In a stinging critique Diehl wrote:

•

•
•
•

The CIP is more effective in affecting social
change leading to a democratic society than is the
Student Government that merely says it favors a
democratic society, but is not in favor of taking
the steps necessary to create such a society. The
Student Government is interested in perpetuating
the illusion that we live in a democratic society
because we have been taught so since childhood,
whereas the CIP is interested in making that
illusion a reality whereby all men are guaranteed
social, political, and economic justice� The
Student Government seems to be in a 'Let's
Pretend' game, whereas the CIP are responsible in
the American tradition to the general guaranteed
rights and liberities upon which the American
society is statedly based, whereas members of the
Student Government aie not. The CIP is interested
in solving the great social problems facing our
country today, whereas, members of the Student
Government, for the most part, are barely aware
these 'Prob 1 ems ex ist, and fa i 1 to rea 1 i z e their
responsibility toward their solution. The Student
Government, in taking its clues from the
Administration, sacrifices social and political
controversy for the sake of public rel��ions, and
this is certainly not true of the CIP.
Obviously, Diehl displayed considerable bias in his
analysis, but not without some justification.

In the last

part of his statement, Diehl accused the Student Government
of "taking its clues from the Administration."

These were

strong words, but seemingly his position was validated by
the amazing similarity between the neutral stance of the
Student Senate and the policies of President Smith.

•
•
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The overall situation at MU remained bad for black
students in the 1960s.

•

discrimination abounded at MU.

Seldom did racism come to

the surface, but blacks often felt it boiling beneath a
facade of neutrality.

•

Covert racial hostility and

Even sensitive whites were cognizant

of the campus environment confronting black students.
Political Science professor Simon Perry remembered the
difficulty black students had in attaining "the kind of

•
•

respect that they deserved."

Charles Aurand recalled that

many professors and students believed and sometimes stated
that blacks "were· pushing too hard. 1143
The case of Michael Gray demonstrated that blacks
considered the atmosphere at MU hostile.

Gray, who

graduated from Huntington High School in 1964, readily

•

acknowledged that his parents influenced his thoughts on
civil rights by encouraging critical thought and sensible
decisions based upon considerations of equality and human

•

•

dignity.

He often spoke with several of his black friends

at MU about the school and their activities.

Even as a

student at West Virginia State College in 1964 and 1965,
Gray retained close ties to black MU students and the CIP
because of a Tuesday-Thursday schedule which enabled him to
be in Huntington from Thursday evening through Monday.

•
I

•

"So," according to Gray, "although I wasn' t a student at
Marshall, I was on the campus all the time until it was time
to go back to West Virginia State for my classes.'' 44 As a
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Huntingtonian, Gray knew what MU meant to him, his
neighbors, and to the black students at the University.
Except for one summer term, Gray refused to attend
Marshall University because of the school's environment
which was not conducive to black students.

Gray had no

difficulty choosing West Virginia State College over
Marshall University:
I would never have chosen Marshall University.
Never. Being raised in the black community of
Huntington you understood what Marshall University
stood for, and that's basically nothing in
connection with interest of black people.
Marshall University from what I was hearing from
the age of two, you know, Marshall University
never stood for anything. So, therefore, I never
gave a thought of going to Marshall University.
Never. Never a thought because the impression
that M�rsh �ll has ma�e on black4geople in that
community is a negative one ....

•

Gray's perceptions were apparently shared by black
Huntington residents who knew of the environment confronting
black students at MU, and this hurt the University's ability

•

to attract and to keep bright young blacks from the area.
MU's environment with its covert hostility and
discrimination certainly could not and did not foster a rich

•

and active student life for black students before the CIP's
arrival in 1963.

However, Charles Moffat contended that in

the 1960s under President Smith "the

•

vast

majority of black

students enjoyed a felicitous relationship with the student
body, and several of them had achieved o�tstanding records
. at hl et·1cs and 1n
·
·
1146
1n
.
the campus 1 eadersh'1p organ1zat1ons.
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On one level of analysis Moffat's statement is correct.
Black students, like Hal Greer, Roy Goines, and Marclan
Walker; did make spectacular achievements.

Greer and Goines

broke down racial barriers in athletics and leadership
organizations such as The Robe (senior male honorary), the
Reserve Officers Training Corps (R.O.T.C.), and Who's Who
Among American University and College Students.

Marclan

Walker joined Goines as a member of Who's Who, while

•

integrating Fagus (senior female honorary), The Parthenon,

•

MU, but they were responsible for the bulk of black

the International Relations Club, and numerous other campus
organizations.47 These were not the only black pioneers at
integration into student organizations on campus.

Yet, this

does not mean that blacks flocked into the "integrated"

•

organizations,. or that white students openly welcomed other
black students to join their groups.

A meaningful

examination of black student life has to be more than a

•

recitation of initial racial barrier breakdowns.

Prejudice

apparently did exist in abundance and must be accounted for
when evaluating black student life at MU in the days before

•

civil rights awareness developed .
The academic atmosphere at MU in the fifties and early
sixties was a major source of frustration for black students

•

and their campus experience.

Phil Carter explained that:

we say we really didn't face any overt
prejudice in the classroom. But then, each one of
us when we get together even to this day, we start

•
•

•
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discussing different professors. We can
independently come up with the same general
conclusions. That there may have been no more than
four, five white professors on this campus that we
really, deep down inside felt we could get a fair
shake from.
When I recall some of the things that were
said to me in the classroom, sa2e of the
assumptions that were made....
Blatant racism did exist in the classroom.

Phil Carter

vividly recalled statem�nts in his Sociology class with Dr.
Richardson that prompted him to tell other students:

•
•

" 'don't be 1 ieve what this man is sa ying i n c 1 as s. "'

"There

were assumptions [by Richardson] that all black people had
TB and syphillis," Carter claimed, "and he would
literally...come out and say these things.1149 Carter
protested what Dr. Richardson stated in class and frequently
confronted him with articles from black magazines, but to no

•
•
•
•

avail.

Carter also recounted an incident with an economics

professor.
He called me 'nigger' in class, and it so
stunned me that, you know, I just didn't know how
in the Hell to react....So, being the only black
in class whenever these things would happen, you
know, there were never more than one of us in a
class at the same time. You knew what you would
probably do under different circumstances, but you
didn't know how to handle it when §aat professor
would make those kinds of remarks.
Carter's ciassmates also took exception to the professor's
remark because several of the white students reportedly
conveyed the remark to President Smith.51
To combat the discrimination they encountered, black
students had few role models on campus to turn to for
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support or advice.

A few professors such as William Cook,

Simon Perry, and Paul Stewart treated black students fairly,
while making reasonable academic demands of them.

Black

students could also approach these professors for personal
or academic advice.

However, not a single black faculty

member or administrator could act as a role model because MU
had none.

Similiarly, black students could not go to people

in a Minority Student Office or Black Cultural Center
because neither existed.

The only blacks employed on the

campus were in unskilled labor positions.

Thus, bla�k

students turned to Ernie McClinton, Hodges Hall maintenance
worker, and other black workers for support and advice.
Phil Carter remarked that McClinton "ended up being the
counselor, the disciplinarian, and the advisor for all
blacks.1152
Another important aspect of any student's existence was
a social life.

However, the opportunities for a social life

were few for MU's black students, in part because many
social events catered exclusively to the white fraternities
and sororities.

The Greek system at MU remained a white

domain until 1968 with the exception of one black
fraternity, Kappa Alpha Psi, which formed in 1962. A black
sorority did not exist until the 1970s.53 Consequently,

•
•

fraternities and sororities did not provide a social outlet
for black students.

In the Fifties and early Sixties,

because of the small number of blacks at MU, they tended to

•
•
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know each other personally.

Occasionally, MU and West

Virginia State College offered mixers that were open to

•
•

black and white students.

social life on campus revolved around rap sessions and
·
54
drin
· k'ing in dorm r·ooms.
MU's black students therefore went for entertainment to
the Huntington black community, which centered on Eighth
Avenue.

•

More frequently, though, black

there.

Blacks could enjoy a great variety of activities
The Bison's Club treated MU's black athletes royally

and openly welcomed all black students, while providing an
opportunity for black men and women to socialize together.

•

Area churches and black families also provided other social
.
events. 55
Student life for bl�ck athletes at MU entailed even

•
•

more exposure to covert forms of discrimination.

Carter, integration at MU meant "integrating the athletic
teams.1156 He estimated that seventy to eighty percent of
the black students in the early 1960s were athletes.

•

Black

athletes lived in Hodges Hall with white at hletes, but
blacks and whites never shared a room.

•

For Phil

In the case of an

·odd number of athletes, somebody got a room to himself .
Additionally, an unwritten ratio system in playing black
basketball players apparently lingered into the late
S.1xt1es
. . 57
As Bruce Moody, a graduating black basketball player,
wrote in The Parthenon in 1962, "Athletes at Marshall are
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not privileged to escape the hardships of racial
d.iscrimination.
. .
.
1158 Moody argued that discrimination was
much more visible to athletes because they could enter
exclusive white establishments as a part of a MU athletic
team; however, they could not enter the same establishments
as black individuals.

Not only did this frustrate MU's

black athletes, but it also had the potential to damage them
pyschologically.

"At times," wrote Moody, "I was quite
depressed with the feeling of being 'different. 11159
Phil Carter contended that the atmosphere for black
.athletes "was not conducive to growth and development of a
black man," and that they actually felt despised by
.

whites. 60

Carter could not precisely define the feeling but

insisted many black athlet�s still carry the scars:

•
•

Contrary to what we were able to accomplish
athletically, there was something that never
really accomodated us. And you'll find most of
the athletes, most of them I have talked to, have
the same feeling even more intense. To this day,
they will not set foot on this campus. I tried to
get some back in '83 and most of them told me
point blank, 'I will never set foot on that campus
again given the treatment that I received.' ... This
is a very deep seated feeling of being despised.
It goes beyond not being wanted. A feeling that
people despised you ...We basically felt Marshall
didn't want us having any identity. So people
lef� here �ith those feelings and those
attitudes.
Carter also asserted that though MU brought in black

•

athletes from all over the country and expected them to be
aggressive.players on the field or court, they were not
allowed to display the same assertiveness in any other phase

•

•
•
•
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of student life.

In essence, the campus environment at MU

stymied the development of black athletes just as it
restricted the development of a rich, well-rounded student
life for all black students.62
Clearly, civil rights and racial justice did not really

•

exist at MU before the CIP arrived in 1963 and shook the
campus out of its passive doldrums.

With a misguided sens�

of neutrality, President Smith, the faculty as a whole, and

•

student government did not intend to do much of true
significance about civil rights.

Similarly, the campus

environment reeked with negative feedback for most black

•

students, causing a diminished black student life
academically, socially, and athletically.

Seldom could

black MU students enjoy the richne.ss and diversity of the

•

white student experience.

The feeling of being whole, of

being treated as an equal human being, escaped most black
students' experience before 1963.

•

To blacks, Marshall

University had to mean something more than just letting them
enter the classroom.

The CIP proved to be essential because

the group forced President Smith, the faculty, and the
student body to consider black students' rights and demands
by creating awareness of campus discrimination and negative
racial attitudes .

•
•

•
•
•
•
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Chapter VI
Actions Creating Awareness at MU
To create awareness of racial injustice and prod
people to respond to civil rights efforts, the CIP realized
actions designed to reveal discrimination and force a
reaction were necessary.

•

Consequently, the group focused

its attack on MU's Greek system which dominated student life
throughout the 1950s and 1960s by not only controlling
student government, but also by monopolizing the social life

•
•

at MU.

Because the existing Greek organizations remained

lily-white, blacks found the road to campus leadership and
social activities effectively closed.1 In order to create
these opportunities for themselves and other black students,
Phil Carter and a group of black males formed the Epsilon
Delta Chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi and obtained national

•

,.
•·
•

recognition on December 2, 1962.

The

fraternity performed

social service projects and provided social events like its
annual spring formal, The Sweetheart Ball.
did not sufficiently alleviate the problem.

This, however,
Creating

sensitivity to blacks' social and leadership needs depended
upon integration of the whole Greek system.

But, not until

1968 when John Shellcroft pledged Zeta Beta Tau did a white
fraternity admit a black.

Clearly, blacks at MU lived in a
2
.
d soc1a
. 1 environment.
.
restr1cte
The CIP helped to alleviate the social deprivation at
MU.

The social activities of the CIP were not the primary

goals of the organization, of course, but they were
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essential.

As previously mentioned, an inner circle of CIP

core members and an outer circle of members existed.

•

The

outer circle consisted of students who could not become
totally committed because of time or financial constraints
as well as students who simply lacked a total commitment to

•

the cause.

Thts latter group tended to be those most

interested in the CIP's social activities.

One inner circle

member considered the CIP's social activities a crucial

•
•

tactic to insure workers for the organization:
They [CIP leaders] understood you had to have so
much social to keep this outer circle happy.
Because if you don't ·show up on the god-damn line
when we need you, we threw some of the best
parties in the world, you wasn't [sic] going to be
invited to the party. Now you never s�id that.
But shoot, that's part of the concept.
However, unlike other organizations, the CIP threw truly

•

interracial parties.

The CIP knew how to use social

activities to coax the help of those not truly committed to
the cause and to say thank you or to reward their more

•

active members.

As a result, the CIP provided an oasis of
social activity for black and white MU students.4
The major social event sponsored by the CIP was a

•

Hootenanny featuring Donald Lease on the MU campus on
November 2, 1963.

Lease, a native of Huntington and nephew

of Bunche Gray, was a drama major at Howard University and a

•

rising star of folk music.

A The Parthenon article claimed

that "after a little more than two years, Lease has been
acclaimed as one of Washington's foremost folk singers, and

132.
the most sought after folk singer in the Southeastern United
States.115 Lease frequently performed in the Washington,
D.C., area with rave reviews from entertainment critics and
had cut one album.

His most famous performance to date had

been at the Chicago Folk Festival when he sang with Odetta,
6
.
.
at that time.
one of the greatest folk singers
The fact .that an organization like the CIP put so much
effort into social activities indicates the sparsity of
interracial activities at Marshall.

Full integration of the

social life on MU's campus was not yet a reality, and the
CIP served an important social function as a bridge that
allowed blacks and whites to socialize with each other.
However, the CIP's efforts alone were not sufficient to
fulfill the social needs of MU's black students.

Therefore,

it is not surprising that the CIP attempted to eliminate the
racism and discrimination inherent in MU's Greek system by
exposing it to MU's administration, faculty and students.

•

The first and most significant CIP protest against MU's
Greek system involved the Kappa Alpha Order (KA).

To

ex�lude ·blacks as the fraternities and sororities did was

•

one thing, but annually to parade white supremacy and Old
South segregationist values all over campus was quite
another matter.

•

The KAs' Old South Weekend was such an

event and its offensiveness infuriated a number of black MU
students.

Consequently, the CIP sought to destroy this
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distasteful event or, at the very least, significantly alter
it .
The impetus behind the Old South Weekend stemmed from
the KAs' celebration of the birthday of Robert E. Lee, the
fraternity's spiritual founder, on the first weekend in May.
A typical Old South Weekend began on a Thursday with the
issuance of formal written invitations to the KAs' "Southern
belles."

The festivities started the following day with KA

members chalking a "Mason-Dixon" line across campus and the
administration turning the University over to the KAs who
had " seceded" fr om the union in an ear 1 ier ritua 1.

•

This

ceremony recalled MU's occupation during the Civil War by
Confederate General Albert Gallatin Jenkins.

Afterwards,

the KAs announced a Rose o� Old South Queen and, accompanied

•

by area high school ba�ds, paraded to Huntington's City Hall
where the mayor or city manager officially surrendered the
city to the KAs.

•

During the entire event, KA members wore

Confederate uniforms, the belles displayed hooped skirts,
and the Confederate flag flew over the campus and city,
including City Hall.

•

On Saturday evening the KAs held the

Old South Ball in the American Legion Hall, where the
Confederate flag temporarily replaced the American flag.

A

picnic on Sunday afternoon ended the celebration of the Old

•

South Weekend. 7

Old South Weekend 1n 1964 was scheduled to begin on
Thursday April 30.

•

However, the CIP refused to continue to
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let the ritual go unchallenged.

Shortly before the event,

Pat Austin initiated the CIP's. assault upon the Old South
Weekend in a letter to the editor of The Parthenon.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Next weekend, in a ritual commonly known as
"Old South Weekend," Marshall University will be
festively reminded of America's most shameful
crime against itself and all humanity....I
consider the proposed celebration, so-called, as
deplorable. I am appalled by the fact that an
official of Marshall University plans to
"surrender" this campus to·an organization that
considers it honorable to lower the �merican flag
in favor of the Confederate flag....
Austin added that MU and the State of West Virginia
projected images as being "liberal" and "progressive."

Yet,

MU, a state supported institution, participated in "a
ceremonious reincarnation of the breakdown of human
relations in this country.119 Austin said she and many other
black students did not find this action and official
sanction by MU as being liberal or progressive, but quite
the contrary.

Instead, the KAs' celebration of the Old

South represented a glorification of a system based on
slavery and racial oppresssion.

Tradition or not, many of

the Old South Weekend rituals undermined blacks' dignity and
sorely reminded them of their own oppression in the 1960s.
Blacks found no re�son for people to be reminded of, let
alone to celebrate, past inhumane practices or needlessly to
assault blacks with such a display.

Austin concluded by

asking, "Must we bear the humiliation of this celebration
another year?" 10

•
•
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A CIP contingent, which included Austin and Phil
Carter, backed by the moral support of the Huntington

•

Chapter of the NAACP and the West Virginia Human Rights
Commission, directed this question to President Stewart H.
Smith at an April 29, 1964, meeting.

•

In a typed statement

the CIP demanded that Smith withdraw official University
sanction of the Old South Weekend, ban the use of the
Confederate flag at University athletic contests, and

•

prohibit the Confederate flag from being placed beside the
Am�rican flag at ROTC balls.

Smith's notes taken at the

meeting indicate that the majority of the discussion

•

concerned the CIP's first demand of withdrawal of official
University sanction of the Old South festivities.

Smith

noted that the CIP's objections to the Old South Weekend

•

dealt with the activities on campus and the University's
participation.

The CIP opposed participation by the

University faculty and administration, drawing of the

•
•

Mason-Dixon line, use of the Confederate flags, the
surrendering of the campus, and the KAs' secession
program.11
Realizing that they could not violate the KAs' right to
celebrate the Old South and knowing that neither the
fraternity nor the administration would hear of getting rid

•
•

of the Old South festivities, the CIP demanded the Old South
Weekend ceremonies be removed from the MU campus and the end
of certain rituals .

If MU officials accepted its demands,

•
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•

the Old South celebration would be much diluted and more
tolerable and sensitive to blacks.

The KAs could still

preserve Lee's spirit and celebrate his birthday and the Old

•

South with the more festive aspects of the occasion such as
the dances, a revised parade and the Sunday picnic.

•

The CIP

activists thought this to be.a fair solution because they
saw the traditional Old South Weekend as a violation of
racial justice and a menace to racial understanding and

•

better race relations.

In the CIP's statement of demands to

Smith, Austin and Carter declared, "this outmoded,
anti-democratic, and un-Christian act is nothing more than a

•

deification of race separation.

All those who do not act to

.
.
.
.
prevent 1t
are sanct1on1ng
1t
.... "12

Despite the CIP's efforts, Smith continued to sanction

•

the KAs' Old South Weekend.

He cited insufficient time to

study the situation properly before the ceremonies began.
Also, he stated that he had discussed the CIP's complaints

•

about the Old South Weekend with the Administrative Cabinet
and many of the members expressed surprise and failed to see
a connection between the Old South Weekend and integration.

•

Smith promised, though, that he would register the CIP's
complaints with the KA Order and work to remove questionable
rituals.

•
•

To the CIP activists, however, this was just more

evidence of Smith's, and his administration's, indifference
and confirmed in their minds that MU was an anti-black
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institution, a sentiment they had expressed to Smith at
their April 29th meeting.13

•

The Student Senate's denial of moral support later that
evening further convinced the CIP activists of MU's
anti-black bias.

•
•

John Cross introduced a resolution calling

for the Stude�t Senate to oppose ''the Kappa Alpha
fraternity's receiving administrative sanction for the
surrenduring of the campus to their glorification of the
Confederacy.... 1114 Cross stated he introduced the
resolution because black students considered the Old South
Weekend to be blatant racial discrimination.

•

declared that whether or not black's perceptions were
correct did not matter, his arguments did not appeal to Ann
Humphreys.

•

Though he

She contended that the South could not be

associated with slavery and that the KAs did not overtly
connect discrimination with the Old South Weekend.

Other

student senators stated positions similar to Humphreys' and

•
•

led the charge in defeating Cross' resolution, 25-3.

Senate

advisor Simon Perry lamented that "the senate has had
another opportunity to throttle bigotry and, again, it
didn't take it.1115 The Student Senate had once again joined
President Smith in perpetuating the status quo and hindering
positive change to which the GIP responded by announcing

•

that the group planned to protest the impending campus
.
ceremonies. 16

138

True to their word, about twenty-five CIP demonstrators
marched from the Women's Gym to a stand in front of the old
Shawkey Student Union where the secession ceremony was to be
held.

However, KA members were prepared for the CIP

demonstrators.

The chapter president, Bill Hendrick, began

the ceremony with a statement disapproving of the CIP's
objections.

,.

American flag, while a fraternity member on the stand
unfurled an American flag in place of the usual "Stars and
Bars" of Dixie.
applauded.

•
•

He then stated that the KAs never abused the

spoke.

The crowd, including the CIP demonstrators,

Next, Stanley· A. Shaw, Dean of Men, stood and

Though he did not officially "surrender" the campus

to the KAs, Dean Shaw declared:
I am very proud of this organization. Nothing
would make me happier at this time than to turn
the campus over to this fraternity. This is their
idea; they talked it over mong themselves and
17
decided to use this plan.
After Dean Shaw sat down, the KAs said the Pledge of

•

Allegiance, sang the National Anthem, and named a new Old
South Queen.

With the conclusion of the campus ceremonies

the KA members, dressed in suits rather than their

•
•

traditional Confederate uniforms, toured Huntington in cars
and then returned to their fraternity house.

The KAs

completely skipped the ritual of receiving the surrender of
City Hall and hoisting the Confederate flag, and did not use

a Confederate flag at any time during the day. 18
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Apparently, KA members decided for and by themselves to
alter the Old South ceremony.

At least, in his statement

Dean Shaw stressed that neither the faculty nor the
administration influenced the KAs' decision to alter their
ceremony and Hedrick confirmed that the KAs voluntarily and

•

independently opted for the changes.

He stated that one

hundred percent of the chapter had voted on the previous
evening, April 30, to suspend temporarily the traditional

•
•

ceremony in favor of one less controversial.

the KAs saw nothing wrong with the traditional ceremony and
hoped for its return, but felt the altered program was
expedient for the moment.19
Hedrick insisted that the fraternity had the right to
·
ce 1 ebrate t1ne
ceremony any way i• t chose:

•

•
•

"the school had

sanctioned the ceremony; we could have carried through with
it completely as we have done in the past .... It was our own
d ecision.
. .
1120

•

Hedrick and

is less clear.

This seems undeniable.

The motive, however,

The KAs could have easily continued their

traditional celebration.

After all, the CIP protested

anyway.· So, the changes were not to avoid the embarrassment
of a demonstration.

Quite the contrary, the unexpected

alterations placed the CIP demonstrators in an awkward
position.

How could a protest be made against the American

flag and students respectably clad in suits who omitted the
secession program and related rites?

Consequently, the KAs'

purpose could have been to embarrass the CIP by upstaging
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them.

Nancy Potter Matthews considered the KAs' action,

whether conscious or not, a move to turn the CIP's protest
into a "non-eve·nt" so attention would be diverted away from
the fraternity and the Greek system. 21 Certainly, Matthews'
analysis of the end result appears correct, but it fails to
reveal the initial motivation of the KAs.
Another possible reason for the KAs' decision to change
their secession ceremony could have stemmed from an
apprehension of incurring the wrath of their national
affiliates.

According to the national policy of the KA

Order, secession rituals and other similar ceremonies were
not a part of the organization's officially sanctioned
activities.

•
•
•

The KA national policy read:

... But we disapprove of and request the
abandonment or discontinuance of Sece·ssion
ceremonies, mock assassinations of Union Military
leaders and similar displays of anachronistic
sectionalism. Not only are these occurrences
misunderstood and consequently criticized,
bringing unnecessary opprobrium upon the Order but
also, and more important, they are alien to the
principles and example2�f our spiritual founder
whom we would emulate.
The KA national policy also elaborated on the use of
the Confederate flag.

The official flag of the KA Order

consisted of crimson, white and gold bars with a crimson
Greek symbol.

The Confederate flag was not an official

symbol for the fraternity but it retained its symbolic
importance.

The KAs could display the Confederate flag at

social functions, inside the fraternity houses, and from

•
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•

flagpoles -- with preference accorded to the American flag.
So, while the Confederate flag.was an integral part of the
KA tradition, secession rituals and similar activities as

•

practiced by the Beta Epsilon Chapter put the local chapter
at odds with the KA national policy.

In all probability the

KA national order knew of Beta Epsilon's traditional

•

secession ceremonies.

But, so long as the local chapter's

celebration did not cause embarrassment or problems for MU's
administration, the national was apt to ignore the

•

situation.

The CIP, however, had drawn considerable

attention to Beta Epsilon's practices and had put the MU
administration on the spot.

•

Therefore, the KA national

might require the Beta Epsilon Chapter to end their
traditional secession ceremonies.

Thus, quite possibly,

rather than upset the KA national and embarrass themselves,

•

the members of Beta Epsilon agreed to make the voluntary

.
. their
. ritua
.
1 23
a 1 terations
in

Of course, the CIP had no way of knowing the KAs would

•

change their program, let alone understand why they would do
so.

and consequently they praised the members of KA.

•
•
•

The CIP only knew that the KAs did change their program
Though

surprised; Phil Caiter called the revised program ''an
improvement," but hoped for even more changes.

I

Danie

Stewart and Pat Austin considered the KAs' revisions a
mature and positive step toward racial understanding and
justice.24 In a letter to the editor of The Parthenon, Pat

•
·•
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Austin conveyed the CIP's response to the KAs and their
revised program.

•
•
1.

The Kappa Alpha Order fraternity has made a
commendable stand for civil rights. The Civic
Interest Progressives would like to congratulate
them for their mature and responsible decision.
Once made aware that their "ceremony" was
offensive to a portion of the student body and
faculty, they so altered it to remove the "most"
-objectionable aspects....
Much progress in the field of human relations
has been made through demonstrations and the
creation of public awareness. Kappa Alpha Order
is to be ��ngratulated for its progressive
behavior.
In essence, the CIP congratulated the KAs for making
changes in their Old South celebration, but the CIP

•

simultaneously patted themselves on the back for raising the
objections and demonstrating.

The latter was probably done

to temper praise for the KAs' actions.

•

Evidence of

modifying the KAs' achievement existed in the phrase
"altered it to remove the 'most' objectionable aspects."
The CIP concluded the KAs had made an overture that deserved

·•
I

some praise, but further steps needed to be taken.

In the

letter the CIP declared the KAs' action a mandate for MU's
�dministration.

Austin also insisted that though many

people considered black objections to the Old South
celebration as "trivial," the event was a major problem to
black MU students and one which sparked much debate and
thinking across the campus. 26
The student views expressed in The Parthenon
unanimously opposed the CIP stand on the Old South Weekend.
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A KA member, Douglas Pelfrey, defended his fraternity's
celebration expounding at length on the history of the KA

•
•

Order and on the Old South Weekend.

Pelfrey stressed that

the KAs celebrated "the color, valor, daring and romance" of
the Old South. 27 He asserted that the KA members respected
the American flag and many of them belonged to military
reserve units.

Pelfrey asserted that too much fuss had been

made about the Old South Weekend, a celebration enjoyed by

•
•

many and one that did not violate anybody's personal
freedoms and rights.

He concluded by asking the CIP, "to be

as tolerant with our beliefs as we have and will try to be
with theirs.1128
Pelfrey's letter bolstered the KAs' image as the good
guys and drew written applause from subsequent letter

•

writers, all of whom criticized the CIP.

Lucretia Ellen

Metz lambasted the CIP for the pettiness of their protest.
She felt that how the KAs, a private organization, spent one

•

weekend a year was a trivial matter and none of the CIP's
concern.

Surely, she insisted, the CIP could find something

more important to protest.

Peg Guertin and Pete Skiades in

•

separate letters accused the CIP of senselessly damaging

•

CIP ·of ruining the racial atmosphere at MU.

MU's progressive reputation and jeopardizing the "excellent
race relations that existed."29 Skiades even accused the
letter, Skiades wrote:

To conclude his

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

144
Thank you Miss Austin, Mr. Carter and sheep
for polluting the harmonious atmosphere and good
will which once existed on our campus.
Yes, Miss Austin, this is still the land of
liberty!
No, Mr. Carter, not of irresponsibility.
Yes, Miss Austin, it is the home of the
brave!
N�� Mr. Carter, it is not the home of the
slave.
In another letter, Chuck Delehanty, a picket for the
CIP at the White Pantry believed that the group had gone too
far in attacking MU, and listed criticisms similar to those
of Metz, Guertin and Skiades and offered his advice on how
the CIP should proceed in the future.

Delehanty reiterated

that MU was, under President Smith, a progressive civil
rights institution, and argued the demonstration against the
KAs hurt the CIP's cause over a grievance he deemed invalid.
Delehanty advised the CIP to write out its grievances and
request a discussion of them with President Smith and the
student body.31
Rarely did five students write on the same issue to The
Parthenon editor, but even more significantly, each of the
five who did write, disagreed with the CIP.

Apparently, the

CIP's demonstration against the KAs upset a number of MU
students.

But, the CIP disturbed other people also.

John

R. Brown, a KA alumnus, wrote directly to Smith expressing
his anger at the CIP for raising objections to the Old South
Weekend and urged �he President not to curtail the KAs'
celebration in any way.

Brown criticized the CIP as a

•
•
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"Johnny-come-lately campus group" that sought "notoriety at
the expense of an old and established organization. 1132

•

He

then encouraged Smith to check the alumni list for both
organizations before making his decision.

Brown showed his

ignorance of KA rules by concluding that the KA national

•

would never sanction a chapter engaging in a practice "that
would embarrass any racial group, even the rabble rousing
Civic Interest Progressives. 1133

•

Other KA alumnus may have

expressed their ire to Smith in person and via the
telephone. 34

Despite incurring the displeasure of many MU

students and the KAs, current members and alumnus, however,

•

the CIP had gotten its point across that the Old South
Weekend offended black students at MU.

Although total

victory had not been secured and MU's black students still

•
•
•
•
•

had to endure the KAs' Old South Weekend, the offensive
elements of the rituals had been greatly reduced.
This initial success paled to insignificance, however,
when the CIP and MU's black students witnessed a reactionary
backlash as the KA Order celebrated its 100th anniversary in
1965.

The Beta Epsilon Chapter presented President Smith

with its proposed agenda for the Old South Centennial
Celebration in early March of 1965.

The proposed agenda

called for a return of some customs omitted from the 1964
ceremony.

For instance, the KAs wanted to draw the

Mason-Dixon line across campus, sing "Dixie," and use the
Confederate flag along with the United States flag and

•
•
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singing the "Star Spangled Banner."

The KAs' proposed

agenda for the 1965 Old South Weekend was the traditional

•

celebration deleting only the secession ceremonies at MU and
Huntington's City Hall.

Despite this return to old

standards Smith granted official sanction

•

of the Old South

Weekend and approved of the KAs' proposed agenda minus the
drawing of the Mason-Dixon line.35
As might have been_expected, the CIP was not happy with

•

the KAs' plans or Smith's approval of them.

Alan L. Miller,

member of MU's Students for a Democratic Society (SOS) and
sympathic supporter of the CIP, wrote a letter to the editor

•

of The Parthenon.

In it he expressed the CIP's sentiments,

explaining that the CIP activists were not against gracious
living and southern hospitality, but the lifestyle of the

•

elite class of the antebellum South which resulted from the
exploitation of black slaves.

The good aspects of the "Old

South" never belonged to blacks and still did not pertain to
them in the 1960s.

In his concluding paragraph, Miller

flatly stated the CIP's position concerning the KAs and the
Old South Weekend:

•
•

The CIP is no more against the good things in
southern society than is the KA Order, and if the
KAs would come out as strongly against the evil in
southern society as they do in favor of the good,
the CIP would be proud to join them in 36 heir
celebration, instead of opposing them.
�he CIP never found any reason to join the KAs in their
Old South celebration.

Therefore, .instead of protesting the

•
•
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Old South Weekend in 1965, the CIP created a parallel
observance called "New South Weekend" for the same weekend

•

as the KAs ' celebration.

As the bulk of their

commemoration, the CIP hosted a "Conference on the New
South'' which included speakers representating the Student

•

Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Southern
Conference Educational Fund (SCEF), Students for a
Democratic Society (SDS), the Congress of Racial Equality

•

(CORE), and the Southern Student Organizing Committee
(SSOC).

To counter the KAs' campus ceremonies and _parade on

Friday, April 30, 1965, the program of the New South

•

Conference headlined Steve Weisman, formerly the chair of
the Graduate Coordinating Committee and member of the
overall Steering Committee of the Free Speech Movement (FSM)

•
•
•
•
•

at the University of California at Berkeley.

Weisman had

been touring southern college and university campuses to
present h is in ter·pretation of the recen t FSM even ts at
Berkeley.

Accompanying Weisman on the Friday program was Ed

Hamlet, campus speaker for SSOC, and folk singer Hedy West.
Later that evening the CIP held a New South Ball for the
conference participants and anybody else desiring to share
in their festivities.

For Saturday, May 1, Anne Braden,

noted civil rights author and editor of the Southern
Patriot, a SCEF publication, and Stanley Wise, executive of
SNCC, headed the group of speakers . 37

•
•

148
All in all, the New South Conference was quite an
achievement.

•

The showcase of nationally prominent speakers

in the field of civil rights plus the social activities did
an impressive job of demonstrating what the CIP deemed as a
positive celebration of the South.

•

festivities provided all MU students an alternative to the
KAs' annual ritual.

Once again, the CIP did more than just

complain; the group took action.

•

Also, the CIP's

Though probably nobody

intent on attending the KAs' functions changed plans in
order to participate in the New South activities, the CIP's
observance still acted as an effective protest against the

•

KAs' celebration.

The New South observance was a positive

example of celebration that promoted better race relations
and an overall understanding of racial problems and

•

tensions.

By comparison the KAs' Old South Weekend could

more clearly be seen as a barrier to racial justice and
equality which was allowed to retard race relations at MU

•

and in the Huntington community .
Still, several whites could not and did not perceive
any problems with the Old South celebration.

•

To them, the

whole weekend was just an innocent social gala.

Yet, many

black students at MU and in the CIP considered several of
the traditional Old South ceremonies to be offensive, and

•
•

found it difficult to appreciate southern gallantry and
romanticism when remembering the degrading oppression of the
black race that helped to perpetuate the gracious living of

•
•
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the Old South.

A couple of the KAs' traditional customs

greatly offended MU's black students.

•

Most obvious were the

secession cermonies which had the official sanction and
participation of MU's administration.

By 1964, blacks and

the CIP activists could no longer tolerate.the

•

administration's endorsement of a return to "plantation
mentality. 1138
situation.

•

Something had to be done to alleviate the

Blacks and CIP activists would have liked to

have ended the celebration by the fraternity, but could not
deny the KAs' right to celebrate the Confederacy.

However,

the CIP requested a different, more realistic image that

•

acknowledged the negative aspects as well as the positive.
The overall change blacks desired in the Old South Weekend
was never quite achieved and the KAs continued their

•

modified celebration through at least 1971.

The CIP was

successful, however, in obtaining the stated goal of
removing the most offensive aspects of the KAs' celebration

•
•
•
•

and, by doing so, began creating an expanded racial
awareness at MU by exposing discrminatory practices on
campus, particularly within the Greek system.39
Besides hosting the New South Conference to protest
against the KAs' Old South Weekend, the CIP had already
exerted a tremendous amount of pressure by focusing
attention on the Greek system at MU in Spring 1965.

On

March 13, 1965, the CIP exploited an incident at the Sigma
Phi Epsilon (SPE) fraternity's annual "Blue Mountain Blast"
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at the Police Farm in Wayne County, West Virginia.

The

fraternity hired an all black band to perform at the dance.
As the evening proceeded, several of the participants at the
dance consumed a considerable amount of beer, especially
Mitchell Joseph Thomas, a SPE fraternity member, and Kenneth
Rand Stewart, a guest at the dance. 40
After the dance ended around midnight, fraternity
members attempted, without success, to subdue Thomas and
Stewart, who were shadow boxing and wrestling in the parking
lot.

A band member, Joseph Goss, was walking nearby

carrying a base amplifier to a trailer the band had rented
to haul its instruments.

Thomas intercepted Goss and asked

him if he wanted to fight.

•
•
•
•

Goss replied that he did not but

Thomas struck Goss in the face anyway.
Goss over the amplifier and damaged it.

The blow knocked
Another nearby band

member, Clarence "Rackey" Crawford, Jr., asked who hit Goss.
When Thomas bragged that he had done it, Crawford removed
his coat and stepped toward Thomas.

A general scuffle

erupted after somebody knocked Crawford to the ground in an
effort to restrain him.

Stewart escalated the fighting when

he pounced upon David Chappell, husband of the band's agent,
and struck blows to his head.
the head with a bottle.

Stewart was then struck in

A few SPE members joined in the

fight while others attempted to restore peace.

Finally, the

participants were separated and the band members retreated
to their cars.

Before they were able to leave, however,
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several SPE members rocked and beat one of the cars,

frightening its driver into bumping a parked vehicle.41
Early Sunday morning, Phil Carter, Danny Hall, Michael
Gray, and another CIP member went to the SPE fraternity
house and spoke with fraternity members Andy McQueen and Ray
Twohig about the incident with the band.

Gray described the

encounter this way:

•

These were two moderates in the fraternity as I
viewed it. Real smooth fellows...and they came
down[stairs] trying to calm us and Phil down to
point out that it was a very unfortunate incident.
Phil [Carter] wanted to talk to the guys who were
responsible for the incident but couldn't because
they were upstairs passed out� ..they [McQueen and
Twohig] tried to e��lain to us that it was all
liquor talking....
Carter's and Danny Hall's version, as reported to the
Marshall University Human Relations Commission's (MUHRC)

•

investigating subcommittee, was similiar to Gray's
recollection.

However, when Hall queried Twohig about why

Thomas had attacked Goss, Hall quoted Twohig's answer as,

•
•

"Well, you know the reason as well as I do."

and Hall also concurred with Twohig's statement that Thomas
was prejudiced against blacks.

Hall and Carter believed

the fight had racial overtones.

Also, Carter indicated that

the SPE fraternity expressed an unwillingness to do much
about the matter.

•

Both Carter

Carter recounted:

McQueen and Twohig asked us to keep the
matter quiet. Twohig tried to reason the thing
out. We asked them what they planned to do? They
were very vague, indicating, more or less, that
nothing would be done. We asked what they intend
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to do about this kind of individual? They said
something to the effect that 'Their contributions
outweighed their weakness. They ��d worked very
hard to get the place decorated.'
The fraternity's version of the incident with the band
and the meeting with the CIP were markedly different from
the accounts of Carter, Hall and Gray.

The fraternity

representatives, McQueen, Twohig, and Phil Harmon, a

•
•
•
•
•
•

chaperone at the dance, denied any use of racial slurs at
the dance and argued that the fraternity was not a party to
racism.

Instead, they insisted drunkenness was responsible

for the outbreak and the fraternity's witnesses even
suggested that if any racism existed it was on the part of
Clarence Crawford, one of the black band members.
Unsurprisingly, Twohig's version of the Sunday morning
meeting between the fraternity and the CIP differed from
Carter's account.

In a written statement submitted to Dean

Shay, Twohig explained:
We [the fraternity] asked him [Carter] to let us
handle it, and told him what we knew of it....We
told him that we didn't think it was a race riot,
but that we ·did feel an obligation, further a
responsibility, to deal with the instigators of
the incident and to see to it that all damages
that were repairable be repaired and the band be
assured as to lack of malice and the obvious
spontaneity of the entire situation. We further
requested that he not blow it out of proportion
and that he recognize it for it was--a small
tussle involving drunks, and an unfair treatment.
by thos� dr��ks [sic] of guests of the
Fraternity.
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The investigating subcommittee of the MUHRC had a tough
time deciding where the truth lay.

As a result, Simon Perry

and Wendell English, members of the subcommittee, and Enid
Chappel, manager and member of the band, attended a meeting
at Bunche and Conklin Gray's home.

She testified that the

fraternity members had tampered with the band's equipment
throughout the dance and did use racial slurs during the
fight.

This was contrary to statements she had earlier made
to Dean Shay according to his summary of her testimony.45
In any case, the subcommittee finally ruled that
insufficient evidence existed to determine race as a factor
in the incident.

Rather, the subcommittee concluded that

"...it would be best not to treat the matter as a racial
incident.

The evidence is not sufficient to make such a

conclusion and if we adhere str�ctly to the rules of
empirical proof neither can we conclude that it was not a
racially provoked act.1146 Though recommending not to treat

•

this incident as a racial one through lack of evidence, this
report rather clearly contradicted Shay's March 7 statement
to the President in which he reported that "intoxication of

•

men, not racial bias, appears to be the reason for the
attack.1147 In any case, later that evening President Smith,
acting upon Shay's recommendations, banned the Blue Mountain

•

Blast, placed the Sigma Phi Epsilon fraternity on probation
for one year and suspended the two principle instigators of
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the incident, Thomas and Stewart, from MU for intoxication,
.

not racism.

48

The real controversy was the role of the CIP.

The

fraternity accused the CIP of turning the incident into a
racial one, when it was not.

Also, the fraternity believed

that if the CIP had not publicized the incident, then the
fraternity could have smoothBd over the trouble with the
band quietly and without further embarrassment to itself and
t h e U n1vers1ty.
.
.
49

Phil Carter responded to these

allegations by saying that the CIP was not responsible for
making the dance incident into a racial issue.50
Yet, the CIP appears to have played a significant role
in making people aware of the incident.

After getting no

satisfaction directly from the fraternity, the CIP brought
the case before the Huntington Chapter of the NAACP and
Huntington's Human Rights Commission (HRC).

Neither of

these two entities could do anything about the situation but

•
•

they provided public forums to air the incident.

By

creating public awareness, the CIP placed President Smith in
such a position that he had to deal with the incident and
with it the question of discrimination at MU.51
The day after the public airing of the incident at
Huntington's HRC meeting, Smith made the CIP aware of his

•

displeasure.

The CIP had filed a complaint with the

University asking Smith to put the fraternity on probation
for three years, to suspend the guilty offenders, and to

•
•
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have the fraternity remove Thomas' name from its membership
role.

•
•
•
•

In an article in The Parthenon, Smith expressed his

resentment over the CIP's interference and suggestions:
It is not the prerogative of the CIP or any
other group to dictate to the University
Administration what penalities should be given in
this or any other incident.
It (the CIP) has a right to protest, but any
interference in the University's authority to
administer its rules and regulations is an
encroachment upon the governing responsibilities
of the institution.
The CIP is not a recognized University
organization, has never requested recognition and
therefore has no status on the campus.
By assuming that it can speak for the
University, although not accountable to the
University, the CIP has placed itsel§ in a highly
ambiguous and indefensible position. 2
Nevertheless, as previously noted, Smith did take action in
the direction of the CIP's request though he reacted upon

•

Dean Shay's recommendations, not those of the CIP.
Nancy Potter Matthews, writing from the perspective of
the HRC, perceptively analyzed the CIP's impact:

•
•
•
•

What the CIP had done, however, was to force
the university administration to face the problem,
and it also forced the campus and community to a
public confrontation with a group charging bias
and discrimination, something most of the
community would rather not admit existed, or at
least �elieved was the exception rather than the
rule. 5
Not only was President Smith forced to do something but
he also decided to

have

MU's own Human Relations Committee

investigate the incident.

Though the investigating

subcommittee's recommendation publicly confirmed Smith's
position and actions, MU's Human Relations Committee began

•
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•

an investigation of the Greek system to determine if racial
prejudice and discrimination existed and what could be done
to eliminate it.

•

After meeting with fraternity and sorority

leaders, the Committee's conviction "that discrimination and
prejudice do exist... [in the Greek system] at Marshall" was
con f.1rmed . 54

•

The fraternities and sororities were able to

perpetuate segregation through selection methods which
allowed one "no" vote to reject a pledge.

Greek representatives were not receptive to integration.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Seemingly, the
As

a result, the MUHRC attempted to have projects and

l

discussion groups overcome fears and negative racial
attitudes through interaction, but ultimately to no avail.
However, the MUHRC had come to recognize campus
discrimination and lack of concern for racial justice as the
major problem confronting it.

Dean John Shay wrote in the

MUHRC's annual report:
Foremost, and perhaps most difficult, is the need
to change the campus climate of opinion regarding
racial discrimination. The majority of Marshall
students appear to be indiffere�5 to the problems
of their Negro fellow students.
The CIP maintained heavy pressure on the Greek system
in the wake of th� Blue Mount�in Blast incident.

On March

24, 1965, Rick Diehl carried the CIP's fight against the
Greek system back to the Student Senate.

The first of his

two resolutions unanimously passed and placed the Student
Senate on record as opposing all forms of racial and ethnic
discrimination that occurred anywhere in the "University

•
•
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community."

Diehl's second resolution called for the

formation of a committee specifically to investigate "the

•
•

Greek and non-Greek social system, and if segregation is
discovered then the Senate will utilize all its influence in
· .... 11 56 The
e 1.1m1nat1ng
. . t·10n or segregation
.
. ...the d.1scr1m1na
Student Senate, however, unceremoniously defeated this
resolution by a vote of 16-6.

Once again, the Senate was

willing to condemn racial discrimination as a concept but

•

would not take active steps towards solving the problem on
campus.
Thus the CIP appeared to be back where it started.

•

It

firmly believed racial discrimination existed in the Greek
system, but the CIP activists could not exert enough
pressure by themselves to force President Smith or the

•

Student Senate to seek an end to it.
to create more pressure.

Somehow the CIP needed

Gerald Sigmon, a black MU student

apparently unaffiliated with the CIP, provided a much needed

•

spark when he wrote a lengthy but well written letter in The
Parthenon.

Sigmon charged MU's Greek system with racial

bias, religious hypocrisy, moral laxity, selfishness,

•

intellectual stagnation, and failure to change.

He accused

the Greek system of perpetuating bigotry, hypocrisy,
excessive drinking, stealing, lying, cheating, selfishness,

•

"an atmosphere of petty concern for social trivia" rather
than intellectual pursuits, ·and, most importantly, the
status quo.

To Sigmon, improvement could not take place

•
•
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without change.

Hoping to be a catalyst of change Sigmon

issued this challenge to MU's administration:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

It is time for a rigid appraisal of the
status quo at Marshall University. For years,
every logical facet of this institution has been
geared to the acceptance of an illogical premise;
that the Greek system is a positive force for
good. We have complacently allowed the system to
expand until, like a cancer, it controls one out
of every seven students .
It is time the administration carried out an
extensive and discerning analysis of every
fraternity and every sorority on our campus .. �.
President Smith and Dean Shay must not be
afraid of Alumni censure, or Greek pressure.
Theirs is a task calling for leadership, resolute
courage7 an�7an unvaccillating unwillingness to
compromise.
Sigmon's letter provoked an outpouring of responses in
The Parthenon.

Sigmon did receive one letter of praise but

the rest of the letters were from indignant Greeks anxious
to criticize Sigmon and defend the Greek system.

Most of

the letters ·accused Sigmon of not using facts or
exaggerating the ones he did use.

Also, the Greek

supporting respondents repeated the supposedly good things
the fraternities and sororities did and countercharged that
Sigmon's allegations could easily be applied to MU's
independent students.58
Jim Marnell wrote the most creative and revealing
letter of response.

His letter began:

I was sitting in the den of my five-room
suite at the fraternity house last Friday, busy
throwing darts at a picture of Martin Luther King
and cursing God, mother, and apple pie, when my
slave brought in the new edition of The Parthenon.
I beat him for a few minutes because I had found a

•
•
•
•
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copy of Plato's "Republic" under his bed in the
cellar. "We can't have anything that's not
intellectually stagnating around here. You know
the rules." I gave him some of my old comics and
sent him away.
Being a member of a Greek fraternity I don't
read very well so I handed The Parthenon to my
roommate. She reads pretty well but maybe that's
because she's not a member of the Greek system....
Aroused by my roommate's snickering and deep
belly laughs over the letter I decided to overcome
my mental stagnation �omentarily and examine the
boy's six points.... 5
Through such creative writing and satire Marnell attempted
to refute five of Sigmon's six charges.

He did not deny the

charge of racial discrimination within the Greek system.

He

agreed with Sigmon and pointed out that a black MU student

•
•
•
•
•
•

would have very little chance of being pledged because
unanimous approval by the members was required.

Marnell

shrugged this off as a fact of life and continued his
articulate defense.60 So, even though the Greek system did
not officially sanction racial discrimination the
fraternities and sororities had a structure in place that
promoted the continuance of segregation.

Worse yet, Greeks

like Marnell no longer denied it and arrogantly snubbed MU's
black students.
Sigmon's letter also prompted President Smith to make
some comments at the annual leadership camp for future
campus leaders.

Smith noted that Sigmon's letter levelled

serious accusations at MU's Greek system, and he and the
Greeks would have to respond to Sigmon's challenge.

He

acknowledged that the Greek system was in n�ed of reform,

•
•
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and promised to help all he could, but challenged the Greek
leaders to "behave like adults by assuming responsibility in

•

helping remove the islands of segregation that exist on our
campus.1161

As a part of his challenge, Smith made the

following declaration:

•

During the coming year I expect to see the
fraternities and sororities at Marshall open their
doors to all students enrolled at our University.
I do not ask you to pledge a student because he is
a Negro. What I ask is that you do not reject a
student because of his race. All students,
regardless of color, should be accepted g� the
basis of individual merit and potential.
As David Peyton later observed in his column in The

•
•
•
•
•

Parthenon, the key word in this statement by President Smith
was "expect."

Usually, the word "expect" denotes a hope for

the future or a command to be carried out.

According to

Peyton-, President Smith hedged his meaning of "expect" to
represent a challenge, a safe middle ground definition.

Any

forthcoming desegregation in the Greek system still had to
be done voluntarily by the Greeks themselves.

Smith would

impose no penalty on the Greeks for failure to meet the
challenge. 63
The CIP utilized President Smith's challenge message by
thrusting his words before the Student Senate.

Rick Diehl

introduced another resolution to form a committee which
sought to undermine the "islands of segregation" on campus
by investigating possible avenues of educating the student
body and thereby creating better racial awareness and

•
•
•
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improved attitudes.

After Diehl reassured the senators that

the resolution was not aimed at the Greek system, the
resolution overwhelmingly passed.64
By May 1965, the CIP had been able to get MU's Human
Rights Commission to investigate the Greek system for

•

evidence of racial discrimination, had Smith and the Greeks
admitting that a problem existed, and had prompted the
Student Senate to create a committee with the ultimate

•

purpose of educating against discrimination and eliminating
anti-black racial attitudes.65 MU's administration, the
HRC, the Student Senate and members of the Greek system had

•

all been made aware, albeit grudgingly, of campus racial
discrimination.

Hence, the CIP played a vital role in

bringing about campus awareness of discrimination,

•

particularly in the Greek system, and thereby forced
individuals to deal with the issue of civil rights and
racial justice .

•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Chapter VII

•

The Beginning -- Not the End
In 1963, a group of students at MU formed the CIP as a

•
•
•
•

response to the need for action concerning civil rights.
For over two years the organization sought one goal:
pasitive change toward racial justice.

In order to bring

about this change, the CIP operated as a "challenge
organization" which forced decisions to be made on the issue
of civil rights.

According to Phil Carter, the CIP

was a catalyst to people thinking change. It
provided an opportunity for people in this area to
make their civil rights contribution when people
were making enormous sacrifices of life, and limb,
and effort, and tremend£us amounts of money
throughout the country.
Such a challenge group was necessary in Huntington and
at Marshall to bring about further change.

•

Huntington's old

guard of black activists bound themselves to civility and
accommodation.

Consequently, only minor victories had

previously been gained.

·Mu's need for integrated

establishments for visiting Mid-America Conference athletic
teams and a desire to appear progressive and abide by the
1954 Brown decision were more important factors in obtaining
the integration that had taken place prior to the 1960s.
For more meaningful change to occur� a group such as the CIP
had to spearhead the demand for civil rights, not civility
and the status quo.

By focusing attention on problems and

demanding a response, the CIP questioned the facade of

•
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racial harmony and forced the status quo to be reexamined
and altered.2

•

The CIP challenged racial segregation and
discrimination practices in Huntington and at Marshall by
using high visibility protests which forced perpetuators of
the discriminatory status quo to deal with the issue of
civil rights and either to remain a part of the problem or
support racial justice.

In Huntington, the CIP used the

"share-in" for its initial demonstrations because of the
high publicity generated.

Once business owners effectively

thwarted the share-in tactic, the CIP resorted to other
forms of high visibility protest such as sit-ins and
picketing.

In most cases these forms of protest succeeded

in creating sufficient embarrassment and pressure on
Huntington's business people to force them to integrate and
abstain from other forms of discrimination.
The high visibility demonstrations worked because most
Huntingtonians did not want their insular world exposed and
these conspicuous forms of protest did just that.

Economic

boycotts and legal proceedings would have been ignored and
doomed to failure.

The high visibility demonstration

demanded attention and response.

Also, the ongoing feud

with Roba Quesenberry and the White P�ntry served as a
constant reminder that racism existed in Huntington and that
the CIP was determined to root it out.

In essence,

Quesenberry's bigoted resistance helped the CIP's cause

•
•
•
•
•
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throughout the rest of'the city.

In describing

Quesenberry's resistance, Phil Carter noted the impact of
the CIP's encounters at the White Pantry:
He [Quesenb�rry] did things that were so
ludicrous, so insane that they were unique. In
Selma and some of the other places they [white
resisto�s] gassed people with tear gas. This guy
was using fumigants. He was locking [black]
people inside the restaurant, other whites were
locking them [blacks] outside the restaurant. It
became a Saturday morning circus. 3
Other Huntington businesses wanted to avoid being a
part of this "Saturday morning circus."

As a result, the

people of Huntington agreed to some changes, such as

•

integration of public accommodations, in order to protect
other parts of the status quo.
stimulate positive change.

•

•
•

The CIP started as a civil

rights group seeking to eliminate racial discrimination in
Huntington's business establishments.
succeeded.

•

Nevertheless, the CIP did

In this they

The successful completion of this goal coupled

with graduation stripping the group of its leadership,
Michael Gray believed, caused the CIP to disband:
It all just seems natural that the CIPers
would just fade away because other than my mother
[Bunche Gray] and some of the adult leadership
that supported them, it was a student
organization.... Most of the leaders and the core
people were Marshall University students .... CIP
disappeared and maybe the causes disappeared too.
Everything [was] integrated. So, what CIP was
about on the surface, the integration of these
places, [was] no longer the problem that
exist[ed]. We had other serious problems... but
CIP was much more visible with this integration
bit. So, that problem was gone... 1 4 [ CIP] played
its part--well! Outrageously well!

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Though the CIP initially concentrated on Huntington,
the organization did become concerned with the need for
civil rights at MU.

To summarize the effect of the CIP on

MU's campus is difficult at best.

By May 1965, when the CIP

began disbanding, The Parthenon was still reporting on
charges of racial discrimination and would continue steadily
to do so.

When asked in a The Parthenon poll on May 12,

1965, about discrimination at Marshall, Wendell English, a
black student, quipped, "'I have experienced no
discrimination at Marshall in the last week.

Discrimination

at Marshall is the covert type that smolders under the
superficial fronts of some of the individual students at
Marshall. 1 115 Apparently, the CIP could not make prejudice
go away.
A year later David Peyton wrote in a The Parthenon
editorial:

•
•

Yet, beneath all the "legal integration" of this
bright and shining age lies a more subtle form of
discrimination that is nearly impossible to rout.
No law can erase it. No federal official can spot
it.
It comes from within. Needless to say, this
discrimination occurs on campus every day. And it
ta�es some6hing like a dance to prove its
existence.
The dance Peyton referred to was a Computer Dance sponsored

•

by the Sociology Club on May 13, 1966.

Students bought

tickets to the dance and were match�d by a computer on the
basis of questionnaires that the students completed.

•

ed on an
Students who bought tickets at the door were plac

•
•
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alternate list.

When the second pair of names were called,

� white male was left without a predetermined partner

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

because she had not attended the dance.

Therefore, as

planned, the organizers went to their alternate list.
first female called was black.

The

She stood and then rapidly

sat down when she realized the situation.

A second name

from the alternate list was quickly called.

She too was

black.

Thus, as The Parthenon reported, "the races didn't·
match and the male half of the couple resumed his seat.117
After this incident, the dance and the matchmaking
continued without further confusion.

Both black women

received apologies from the Sociology Club, but the stigma
of social embarrassment remained.

At that time, however,

humiliation was better than the scandal and social ostracism
that would have occurred had a racially mixed couple danced
together.

One white female at the dance called the incident

"the most malicious and degrading thing that I've ever
witnessed.118 Madeline Wolfe, one of the two black females
who stood as alternates, offered a chilling summation of her
feelings about the incident:

"I came here from a southern

state, I was about to readjust to the new life I found in
But after this, Huntington shows me a picture
. Alabama. 119 In itself, Wolfe's
wh.ich is
. typica
. 1 in
Huntington.

assessment was a condemnation of Huntington.

However, Wolfe

could have used the terms "Huntington" and "Marshall
University" interchangeably.
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Racial prejudice, discrimination, and bigotry existed

and after the CIP.

When the CIP focused

the MU campus, the problems were not as clearly obvious
most whites.

President Smith and Marshall perpetuated an

progressivism and blatant bigoted resistance did not

exist.

However, through the demonstrations against Old

south Week, the Blue Mountain Blast incident, and the

constant exposure of discrimination within MU's Greek
system, the CIP made people aware of some of the problems at
Also, through social activities the CIP made life a

•
•
•
•
•

little easier for many black students at MU, and more
enjoyable for many students of both races.

The group's

camaraderie afforded comfort to those students who allowed
their consciences to guide them into supporting civil
rights.
Once the CIP created the awareness that discrimination
pervaded the campus, particularly in the Greek system,
President Smith supported the end of the KAs' secession
ceremonies and vowed to work against campus discrimination,
but depended upon volunteerism rather than exerting direct
pressure for compliance.

After the CIP disbanded in May

1965, a force for racial change no longer existed at
Marshall University or in Huntington, W�st Virginia.
Consequently, President Smith was not pressured to make
further significant changes in the status quo on campus and
MU remained a discouraging place for many black students.

•·
•
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Within three years, however, another group, Freedom and
Racial Equality for Everyone (FREE), would pick up the CIP's

•

fight against racial discrimination on the MU campus.

The

battle for racial justice started by the CIP resumed.lo
President Smith, many other campus leaders, and mo-st

•

Huntingtonians were probably glad to see the CIP leave; to
them, the CIP reaped negative change.

In speaking about

President Smith's feelings on the CIP, historian Charles

•

Moffat wrote of the sentiments held by the power structure
at MU and in Huntington, "The recalcitrance of a few black
students and the infeasibility of some of their demands

•
•
•
•
•
•

convinced President Smith that certain members of the Civic
Interest Progressives had 'succeeded in undoing much of the
progress made at MU in the area of improved human
relations. 11111 In other words, the CIP had violated
President Smith's perception of change and upset the status
quo of his calm and placid campus and the city of
Huntington.
The CIP challenged people to think and either to
support civil rights or become a part of the problem through
non-action.

More importantly, they advocated change and

that was not a well received concept in Huntington or at MU.
The power structure at MU, in Huntington, and in the state
of West Virginia all opposed the change advocated by the
CIP, and may even have gone so far as to keep CIP leaders
under surveillance.

For example, in 1967 Phil Carter
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returned to Huntington to do some anti-poverty work.

Gray

drove him from Huntington to Charleston to catch a flight to
Cleveland, Ohio.

Gray recalled that when they,

arrived at the Alleghany Airline desk ...the clerk,
upon learning Carter's name, told Carter that the
FBI had just called asking if he had yet boarded
the plane. Obviously, the authorities kept tabs
on Phil �,rter and quite probably on the other CIP
leaders.
· President Smith may or may not have found Phil Carter
and the CIP quite so menacing as to need to know their
whereabouts and movements.

However, Smith and most of the

faculty and student body saw the CIP as a disruptive force
attempting to upset their apple cart of racial complacency
with its rhetoric and demonstrations.

Consequently, the

following statement by Michael Gray applies to MU as well as
Huntington and the state of West Virginia.
When Phil [Carter] was in West Virginia some type
of authority network knew....It was for real.
They really felt, for some reason, that Phil
[Carter] and Pat [Austin] were dangerous, and
maybe they were dangerous in li§ht of what they
wanted to achieve -- equality.
Marshall University and the city of Huntington were not
ready for that in the 196Os.

The CIP forced the leaders in

these places to deal with the civil rights issue.

It

accepted the challenge of the 196Os and insisted others do
the same.

Sometimes it succeeded; other efforts failed.

However, at the very least, the CIP refused to allow
Huntington and Marshall University to ignore their own
racism any longer.

Ultimate victory took, perhaps will

175
take, more time, but the CIP began the movement toward
racial justice .

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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